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INTRODUCTION 
Consider the following hypothetical situation: a state legislature, 
seeking to fight back against corporate financial fraud, enacts an 
amendment to its state whistleblower laws.  This amendment requires 
corporate attorneys to publicly report the past financial frauds of 
their clients in certain circumstances—even when this reporting 
involves the disclosure of otherwise confidential client documents.1  
At first glance, the proposal may seem like it would fall within the 
purview of a state legislature: the amendment deals with financial 
fraud prevention and correction, and the state’s general economic 
health, two commonly legislated areas of law.  However, the 
amendment also directly regulates the conduct of practicing 
attorneys.  As such, the amendment would encroach upon the 
regulatory territory of state judiciary branches, which have 
traditionally held themselves out as the sole arbiters of attorney 
conduct.2 
                                                                                                                                         
 1. This hypothetical amendment takes the general form of actual regulations 
supported by many bar associations, enacted by many state judiciaries, and 
promulgated by the SEC. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(d)(2)(iii) (2014); N.Y. RULES OF 
PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(2) (2014); MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 
(2014).  Individual iterations of the rule vary widely from state to state, and from 
institution to institution. Cf. N.J. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2014); 17 C.F.R. 
§ 205.3(d)(2)(iii); see also infra Part II.B. 
 2. See Fred C. Zacharias & Bruce A. Green, Rationalizing Judicial Regulation 
of Lawyers, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 73, 77 (2009).  Many state judiciaries utilize the 
“negative inherent powers” concept to support the notion that their power to 
regulate attorney conduct is exclusive of other branches of government. See 
CHARLES WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS 27 (1986).  The negative inherent 
powers doctrine suggests that because the power to regulate attorney conduct is 
inherent in the judiciary under the state’s constitution, any attempt at such regulation 
by a state legislature violates the separation of powers between branches. See id.  For 
examples of state courts applying the negative inherent powers doctrine, see Preston 
v. Stoops, 373 Ark. 591, 594 (2008) (holding that a state law penalizing deceptive 
trade practices did not apply to attorneys due to separation of powers concerns); 
State ex rel. Doyle v. Frederick J. Hanna & Associates, P.C., 287 Ga. 289 (2010) 
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Attorney behavioral rules, commonly referred to as “rules of 
professional conduct” or “ethics rules,” are typically drafted by 
professional bar associations, which submit these proposed rules to 
the state’s highest court for approval and enactment.3  The rules do 
not become authoritative law in the relevant state unless adopted by 
the state’s highest court, “which is free to draft its own rules, tinker 
with the bar association proposals, or leave the field unregulated.”4  
The attorney-regulation process has thus been dominated by bar 
associations and, to a lesser extent, the courts, whose philosophies 
and approaches to regulation have controlled the field.5  
However, this drafting process has suffered from a lack of rigorous 
public policy analysis.6  While public policy concerns such as 
regulatory effectiveness or economic efficiency have not been wholly 
ignored, scholars argue that such concerns have been overshadowed 
by the extraneous effects of politics, compromise, and public opinion.7  
Rule-makers’ resulting failure to adequately account for the public 
policy implications of their ethics rules has had two primary effects on 
those rules.  First, this failure has hampered the ability of drafters to 
maintain the rules’ effectiveness and relevance in a growing and 
evolving legal industry.8  Second, the failure has played a role in the 
                                                                                                                                         
(relying in part on separation of powers concerns in holding that “only this Court has 
the inherent power to govern the practice of law in Georgia”). 
 3. Jason Mehta, The Development of Federal Professional Responsibility Rules: 
The Effect of Institutional Choice on Rule Outcomes, 6 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & 
ETHICS J. 57, 61 (2007). 
 4. Zacharias & Green, supra note 2, at 94. 
 5. See DEBORAH L. RHODE, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY: ETHICS BY THE 
PERVASIVE METHOD 41 (2d ed. 1998) (noting that “courts frequently have deferred 
or delegated authority to bar associations”); Andrew L. Kaufman, Ethics 2000—
Some Heretical Thoughts, 2001 PROF. LAW. SYMP. ISSUES 1, 4 (2001) (“For most of 
the twentieth century, and into the twenty-first century . . . the ABA has controlled 
the [rulemaking] process”); Eli Wald, Should Judges Regulate Lawyers?, 42 
MCGEORGE L. REV. 149, 175 (2010) [hereinafter Wald, Should Judges Regulate 
Lawyers?]. 
 6. See Ted Schneyer, Professionalism as Bar Politics: The Making of the Model 
Rules of Professional Conduct, 14 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 677, 678 (1989) (providing 
an analysis of the “rare opportunity [the Model Rules process offers] to study the 
internal politics of the bar”); see also David B. Wilkins, How Should We Determine 
Who Should Regulate Lawyers? Managing Conflict and Context in Professional 
Regulation, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 465, 466 (1996) (“The dearth of rigorous 
comparative analysis limited the value of much that was written about professional 
regulation.”). 
 7. See generally Schneyer, supra note 6 (providing a detailed account of the 
various institutional influences in the process of making the Model Rules). 
 8. See Eli Wald, Resizing the Rules of Professional Conduct, 27 GEO. J. LEGAL 
ETHICS 227, 243 (2014) [hereinafter Wald, Resizing the Rules of Professional 
Conduct] (arguing that the “one size fits all” nature of the current ethics rules regime 
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confusing and often contradictory nature of ethics rules as they 
currently stand.9  These difficulties are compounded by the fact that a 
growing number of rulemaking institutions have independently begun 
drafting their own regulations governing overlapping areas of 
attorney behavior.10 
One way in which drafters of ethics rules can overcome these 
problems—and create more effective and efficient regulations—is by 
studying potential applications of rules through a form of public 
policy analysis called “comparative institutional choice 
microanalysis.”11  The purpose of such analysis is to help rule-makers 
better understand how to achieve their desired public policy goals on 
a case-by-case basis.12  Comparative institutional choice microanalysis 
informs decision-makers’ choices through the lens of “institutional 
choice theory” (ICT), which stands for the proposition that the 
effectiveness of a rule is determined by particular qualities of the 
institution tasked with drafting or enforcing said rule.13  According to 
ICT, the ability to make informed decisions regarding which 
institution to entrust with regulatory control is the key to creating 
successful behavioral regulations.14 
ICT is particularly useful in the area of attorney conduct 
regulation, where the social interests underlying a given regulation 
are both varied and complex.15  ICT suggests that, where individuals 
may struggle to fully understand and act on those social interests, 
                                                                                                                                         
made sense for the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, when the practice of law 
itself was more homogenous, but the practice is no longer homogenous, and the rules 
have not adapted to this change); see also Wilkins, supra note 6, at 479 (noting that 
while attorney disciplinary controls have evolved since their creation, “those original 
structures and purposes continue to shape the direction of contemporary 
developments”). 
 9. Wald, Should Judges Regulate Lawyers?, supra note 5, at 167 (characterizing 
ethics rules as a “complex web of uncertainty”). 
 10. See Wilkins, supra note 6, at 467 (noting that “there are now a large number 
of institutions that actively assert at least some regulatory jurisdiction over lawyers, 
and an even greater number that could enter the field in the future”). 
 11. See Edward L. Rubin, The New Legal Process, the Synthesis of Discourse, 
and the Microanalysis of Institutions, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1393, 1425–27 (1996) 
(proposing a framework for the comparison of institutions on a context-specific 
basis). 
 12. See id. at 1425. 
 13. See Gregory Shaffer, Comparative Institutional Analysis and A New Legal 
Realism, 2013 WIS. L. REV. 607, 608 (2013). 
 14. NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN 
LAW, ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 3 (1994). 
 15. See David B. Wilkins, Who Should Regulate Lawyers?, 105 HARV. L. REV. 
799, 860 (1992) (noting that the relationship between ethics rules’ enforcement and 
the rules’ underlying social goals can be complex). 
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rule-making institutions possess a wide variety of characteristics that 
better qualify them to develop and apply regulations to further those 
goals. Because no institution is perfect, a public policy analysis 
applying ICT should consist of relative comparisons of the institutions 
that could regulate a particular behavior.  Further, because the 
conduct governed by attorney ethics rules is so wide-ranging and 
complex, the best institution to regulate one sub-field of attorney 
conduct is not necessarily the best institution to regulate all such sub-
fields.  Thus, a comparison of conduct-regulating institutions should 
be conducted on a case-by-case, context specific basis, labeled in this 
Note as “microanalysis.” 
Combining these features, “comparative institutional choice 
microanalysis” is an ideal framework for helping scholars and policy 
makers to improve the effectiveness, efficiency, and consistency of the 
rules of professional responsibility.  Because this framework must be 
applied independently to particular regulatory contexts, an effective 
institutional choice microanalysis must revolve around a specific rule 
or set of rules, as applied in a specific set of circumstances.16  
Therefore, in providing an example of what a “comparative 
institutional choice microanalysis” might look like, this Note selects 
one particular regulatory context which has garnered significant 
attention and controversy in recent years: confidentiality regulations 
governing an attorney’s ability to blow the whistle on a corporate 
client. 
Part I of this Note outlines the theoretical foundation for ICT, 
tracing its development from the “legal realism” movement of the 
early twentieth century to its more modern form.  It then discusses 
institutional choice theory’s impact on the creation and development 
of attorney conduct regulations in general, and attorney-
whistleblowing regulations in particular.  It stresses that this 
application has so far been rudimentary at best.  Part I then 
introduces a practical framework for applying ICT—comparative 
institutional choice microanalysis—and discusses how this framework 
can be applied to analyze the effectiveness of particular attorney 
conduct regulations from a public policy perspective. 
Part II of this Note lays out the basic set of facts required for a 
thorough institutional choice analysis of attorney whistleblowing 
regulations.  First, because institutional microanalysis is so context-
specific, the relevant factual scenario must be understood in 
                                                                                                                                         
 16. See infra notes 136–40 and accompanying text. 
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significant detail.17  The social goals and interests at stake in that 
context should then be analyzed.18  Based on that understanding, the 
range of institutions which play some role in regulating those social 
goals and interests must be determined.19  Finally, the institutional 
characteristics most relevant to achieving those goals must be set out 
and understood.20  Part II lays out this required background 
information for a comparative institutional analysis of the 
hypothetical legislature-judiciary debate presented by the 
Introduction to this Note. 
Part III of this Note presents the comparative institutional 
microanalysis itself.  To that end, Part III consists of side-by-side 
comparison of three types of institutional characteristics that affect 
state high courts and legislatures’ ability to create attorney-
whistleblowing regulations.  First, this Part discusses the two 
institutions’ expertise.  Expertise is further divided into two 
categories—substantive expertise and procedural expertise.  
Substantive expertise relates to the institutions’ knowledge and 
understanding of particular areas of law or human behavior, and 
procedural expertise relates to their relative capacities to create rules 
in general.  Part III of this Note then discusses the institutions’ 
impartiality, analyzes their institutional “accountability,” and the 
public access they provide to their decision-making process. 
Part III of this Note argues that, when it comes to drafting attorney 
whistleblower regulations, state courts have greater substantive 
expertise, but inferior procedural expertise; state courts are far less 
“independent” from the target of their regulations; and state courts 
are far less accountable or accessible to the public throughout the 
regulation process.  Based on this analysis, Part III of this Note 
concludes that state legislatures would constitute the better institution 
to regulate attorney whistleblowing conduct. 
Significantly, this analysis assumes that all state legislatures and all 
state courts share the same general characteristics; it does not take 
into account differences in public institutions that may occur from 
state to state.  This Part notes two jurisdictions in particular—New 
York and Delaware—where relevant characteristics of the courts and 
legislatures vary significantly from those of other states.21  Part III 
                                                                                                                                         
 17. See id. 
 18. See infra notes 38–44 and accompanying text. 
 19. See infra notes 45–55 and accompanying text. 
 20. See infra note 25 and accompanying text. 
 21. See infra notes 296–309 and accompanying text. 
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suggests additional analyses of these two jurisdictions as a useful topic 
for further institutional analysis study. 
I.  INSTITUTIONAL CHOICE AND COMPARATIVE INSTITUTIONAL 
CHOICE MICROANALYSIS 
A. What Is Institutional Choice Theory? 
1. Theoretical Background 
a. Institutional Choice Theory’s “Legal Realist” Roots 
Modern institutional choice theory has its foundations in the legal 
realism movement of the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries.22  Legal realism stands for the general proposition that the 
effect of particular laws can only be fully understood in light of their 
larger social context.23  For example, legal realism suggests that a 
party or observer cannot accurately predict the outcome of a case 
without taking into account the ideology of the judge or trends in 
society at the time of a ruling.24  While judges are technically not 
supposed to base judicial decisions on political beliefs or real world 
experiences, legal realism argues that it is impossible for even the 
most independent of judges to completely separate himself from such 
extraneous concerns. 
In the same vein, ICT posits that the effect of rules governing 
particular social behaviors can only be fully understood in light of 
characteristics of the institutions responsible for enforcing them.25  
Proponents of ICT and legal realism argue that behavioral regulations 
are most effective when based not on pure legal doctrine or 
precedent, but on an analysis of the practical strengths and 
weaknesses of the various institutional actors competing for 
regulatory control over a particular social behavior.26  In other words, 
                                                                                                                                         
 22. Shaffer, supra note 13, at 608. 
 23. See JOHN MONAHAN & LAURENS WALKER, SOCIAL SCIENCE IN LAW: CASES 
AND MATERIALS 27 (2d ed. 1990).  It replaced previously-accepted concepts of 
“formalism,” which treated the development of precedent and doctrine as occurring 
independently of changing social values and political realities. See id. 
 24. See id. 
 25. See, e.g., Victoria Nourse & Gregory Shaffer, Varieties of New Legal 
Realism: Can a New World Order Prompt a New Legal Theory?, 95 CORNELL L. 
REV. 61, 106 (2009) (noting the view that “judges work in institutional settings that 
shape their decision making”); see also Edward Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Creating 
Legal Doctrine, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 1989, 1991–92 (1996). 
 26. Ted Schneyer, Legal Process Scholarship and the Regulation of Lawyers, 65 
FORDHAM L. REV. 33, 33–34 (1996) (“A legal process scholar might argue that a 
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understanding the broader social context of a policy decision is vital 
in ensuring that its goals can be achieved effectively and efficiently. 27 
b. Institutional Choice Theory’s Social Science Roots 
The importance of public institutions in the policy-making process 
is further supported by social science studies regarding the limitations 
of individuals’ decision-making capacity.28  Among the limitations 
theorized by scholars is the concept of “bounded rationality,” 
developed by political scientist Herbert Simon.29  The concept of 
bounded rationality suggests that the rational capacity of an 
individual is limited by that person’s finite capacity to obtain and 
understand all the information necessary to make informed 
decisions.30  Rationally “bounded” individuals increase their decision-
making capacity by relying on institutions to “simplify and regularize 
a complex environment” beyond the bounds of their own knowledge 
and experience.31  This reliance better enables them to “reach 
decisions in a socially coherent manner and to communicate those 
decisions to other members of society.”32  In incorporating this 
concept, institutional choice theory thus stands for the proposition 
that members of society most effectively solve complex regulatory 
problems not by directly choosing their own goals and solutions, but 
by designating particular institutions to do so on their behalf.33 
2. “Goal Choice” and “Institutional Choice:” Komesar’s Two-Part 
Conceptualization of Modern Institutional Choice Theory 
While the concepts behind ICT can be traced back for centuries, its 
treatment by scholars has seen a reinvigoration in the last several 
                                                                                                                                         
certain institution, because of its relative ability to gather pertinent information, 
should perform a regulatory task.”). 
 27. See Shaffer, supra note 13, at 608; see also HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. 
SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF 
LAW, at lx (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994) (“[T]he key to 
good government is not just figuring out what is the best policy, but figuring out 
which institutions should be making which decisions and how all the institutions 
should interrelate.”). 
 28. See Rubin, supra note 11, at 1414. 
 29. Id. 
 30. See id. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id.; see also MALCOLM RUTHERFORD, INSTITUTIONS IN ECONOMICS: THE OLD 
AND THE NEW INSTITUTIONALISM 81 (1994) (“Institutions provide a basis for action in 
a world that would otherwise be characterized by pervasive ignorance and 
uncertainty.”). 
 33. See Rubin, supra note 11, at 1414. 
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decades.34  Of particular importance to this Note’s analysis is the 
comprehensive formulation of modern institutional choice theory 
developed by Professor Neil Komesar.35  Komesar conceptualizes ICT 
as a framework for assessing society’s pursuit of social goals through 
various public institutions, each of which skews the decision-making 
process in unique ways.36  Under this framework, ICT deals with both 
how society chooses its goals, and how society determines which 
institutions will be responsible for carrying out those goals.  Komesar 
labels these two related aspects of ICT as “goal choice” and 
“institutional choice.”37 
a. “Goal Choice” 
Goal choice analysis compares how society selects its social goals 
and values, prioritizing certain goals over others to achieve a desired 
outcome.38  Such social goals can include promoting economic growth, 
efficiently allocating resources, protecting private property rights, and 
promoting public safety.39  Depending on the particular social context, 
these goals may be broad or narrow in scope;40 they might conflict 
with each other, or they might complement each other.41  Public 
decision-making entities are often faced with choices between such 
varying goals when determining public policy. 
While understanding how an institution chooses from among 
society’s goals is important for evaluating public policy outcomes, 
                                                                                                                                         
 34. Benjamin H. Barton, An Institutional Analysis of Lawyer Regulation: Who 
Should Control Lawyer Regulation—Courts, Legislatures, or the Market?, 37 GA. L. 
REV. 1167, 1172 n.16 (2003). 
 35. Neil Komesar is a professor of law at University of Wisconsin School of Law.  
Neil Komesar, U. WISC. L. SCH., http://law.wisc.edu/profiles/nkomesar@wi (last 
visited May 15, 2015).  His work on institutional choice has had a significant impact 
on diverse areas of legal scholarship, including torts, property, constitutional law, and 
global commerce. See Shaffer, supra note 13 at 607.  While his work is only one part 
of a larger reinvigoration of the institutional choice doctrine over the last several 
decades, it is one of the most influential and comprehensive on the topic, especially as 
applied to the study of law. See, e.g., Barton, supra note 34, at 1172 n.16. 
 36. See Shaffer, supra note 13, at 609 (discussing Komesar’s work). 
 37. See id. (discussing the relationship between “goal choice” and “institutional 
choice” in Komesar’s work). 
 38. KOMESAR, supra note 14, at 4–5. 
 39. Id. at 5. 
 40. For example, a court may seek to protect the property rights of all residents of 
the Hudson River Valley, or the property rights of a homeowner in a particular 
residential neighborhood. 
 41. For example, a rule protecting one’s property rights may conflict with 
another’s economic interests; on the other hand, a rule protecting the environment 
may also protect individuals’ property rights. 
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Komesar asserts that mere analysis of a decision-maker’s choice of 
social goal is not enough to understand how effective a policy will be 
in achieving that desired outcome.42  These social goals can be 
achieved in many ways using a variety of social processes, and a given 
regulation could be applied in conformity with any one of a broad 
range of social goals.43  Thus, a decision-maker’s reasoned balancing 
of social goals alone does not allow it to fully understand which rules 
to apply, or how to apply them, in furtherance of those goals.44 
b. “Institutional Choice” 
According to Komesar, the missing piece of this public policy 
analysis is the determination of who should be responsible for 
determining what an efficient outcome should look like and how it 
should be achieved.45  Komesar labels the process of deciding who 
decides as “institutional choice.”46  Institutional choice analysis 
connects the choice of goal with the eventual public policy outcome 
by determining the “best” process to use to achieve that result.47 
The institutional processes responsible for achieving these public 
policy goals are wide-ranging and complex.48  Komesar focuses on 
three institutional processes, each of which can be broken down into 
smaller components: the political process, the adjudicative process, 
and the market process.49  Public institutions responsible for 
overseeing the political process include city councils, state 
legislatures, and Congress.50  Institutions overseeing the adjudicative 
process include state courts, federal courts, and some administrative 
                                                                                                                                         
 42. KOMESAR, supra note 14, at 5. 
 43. Id. (“Upon close inspection, each social goal bandied about in analyses of law 
and public policy is generally consistent with virtually any law or public policy 
outcome.”); see also Wilkins, supra note 6, at 466–67 (“[R]egulatory institutions can 
pursue [their] goals through a number of interrelated tasks, ranging from drafting 
rules of conduct to enforcing existing rules and imposing sanctions.”). 
 44. See KOMESAR, supra note 14, at 5; Wilkins, supra note 6, at 466–67. 
 45. KOMESAR, supra note 14, at 5 (“A link is missing . . . in analyses that suppose 
that a given law or public policy result follows from a given social goal.  That missing 
link is institutional choice.”). 
 46. Id. 
 47. See id. 
 48. See id. at 3 (“The alternative decision-makers are not individuals or even 
small numbers of individuals.  They are complex processes . . . in which the 
interaction of many participants shape performance.”). 
 49. Id. at 9 (dividing public institutions into market, political, and adjudicative 
categories). 
 50. See id. at 9–10 (noting that broad categories of institutions can be broken out 
into their constituent parts for further institutional analysis). 
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agencies.51   The market process refers generally to a reliance on 
supply and demand and market transactions to achieve social goals.52 
“Institutional choice” in this context refers to an actor’s decision to 
select one regulatory process over another to achieve a particular 
social goal.53  For example, when a judge decides a case based on the 
balancing of parties’ interests, he designates a substantial regulatory 
role to the court system; on the other hand, when a judge applies a 
narrow rule or exception to a case, he allocates more authority to 
carry out judicial directives on the markets or legislature.54  In this 
context, an actor’s “institutional choice” decision is just one (albeit 
the most important) aspect of ICT as a whole.55 
3. How “Goal Choice” and “Institutional Choice” Relate to 
“Comparative Institutional Choice Analysis” 
Because no regulating institution is perfect at its job, the goal-
achieving potential of a particular institution cannot be fully assessed 
without comparing it to other institutions that may share some of the 
same characteristics.56  Thus, no institutional choice decision is fully 
informed without a side-by-side comparison of the strengths and 
weaknesses of the different decision-making bodies which could 
potentially have an impact on the regulatory process.57  Komesar calls 
this form of inquiry “comparative institutional analysis.”58  
                                                                                                                                         
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Daniel H. Cole, The Importance of Being Comparative M. Dale Palmer 
Professorship Inaugural Lecture, 33 IND. L. REV. 921, 930 (2000) (characterizing 
Komesar’s conceptualization of institutional choice). 
 54. Id; see also Nourse & Shaffer, supra note 25, at 106–07. 
 55. NEIL K. KOMESAR, supra note 14, at 4–5 (noting that “analysis of goal and 
value choices, standing alone, tells us ‘virtually nothing’ about these [police] 
outcomes”); but c.f., Howard S. Erlanger & Thomas W. Merrill, Institutional Choice 
and Political Faith, 22 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 959, 988 (1997) (arguing that Komesar’s 
focus on “institutional choice” at the expense of “goal choice” oversimplifies the 
public-policy creation process). 
 56. KOMESAR, supra note 14, at 5 (noting that institutional choice “is always a 
choice among highly imperfect alternatives”). 
 57. Shaffer, supra note 13, at 611–12 (summarizing Komesar’s comparative 
institutional choice framework). 
 58. Id. at 611.  Since the publication of Imperfect Alternatives, comparative 
institutional analysis has been applied across a wide range of disciplines, from tort 
reform to internet regulation to environmental law. See Neil Komesar, The Logic of 
the Law and the Essence of Economics: Reflections on Forty Years in the 
Wilderness, 2013 WIS. L. REV. 265, 327–37 (2013) (collecting institutional choice 
studies).  “Institutional choice microanalysis,” as applied by this Note, is simply a 
case-by-case application of Komesar’s broader “institutional choice analysis” 
framework. 
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Comparative institutional analysis is the methodological framework 
by which scholars and decision-makers can apply the lessons of “goal 
choice,” “institutional choice,” and ICT in general, to practical real-
world situations.59 
B. Institutional Choice and Attorney Behavior Regulations 
1. The Historical Role of ICT in the Creation of Attorney Conduct 
Rules 
Application of ICT can be found throughout the history of the 
development of attorney conduct rules—particularly within the 
development of rules regarding an attorney’s duty of confidentiality 
to a sophisticated corporate client.60  While ICT-based arguments 
have provided significant public policy support for particular 
confidentiality rules, public policy analysis of the process has often 
been overshadowed by the influences of political dispute, practical 
compromise, and public opinion (or lack thereof).61  The following 
events in the development of confidentiality and attorney-
whistleblowing provisions provide examples of institutional choice’s 
visible, but sometimes limited impact. 
a. The Initial Drafting of Model Rule 1.6 
In 1978, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) proposed 
a liberal attorney-whistleblower provision based on its complaint in 
SEC v. Nat’l Student Mktg. Corp.,62 which argued that attorneys 
practicing before the SEC could be held liable for failing to disclose 
the fraudulent activities of their clients.63  However, the SEC decided 
to table its proposal because the American Bar Association (ABA) 
was considering the same issues in its Model Rules drafting process.64  
The ABA drafting committee then sought to craft an attorney-
whistleblower provision that would “be tough enough to convince the 
SEC to back off, yet hedged enough to keep lawyers’ relations with 
                                                                                                                                         
 59. Gregory Shaffer, Comparative Institutional Analysis and A New Legal 
Realism, 2013 WIS. L. REV. 607, 608–09 (2013) (characterizing comparative 
institutional analysis as critical in applying institutional choice theory to inform “real-
life decision making”) 
 60. See Schneyer, supra note 6, at 679. 
 61. See generally id. 
 62. 457 F. Supp. 682, 704 (D.D.C. 1978). 
 63. See Schneyer, supra note 6, at 705–06. 
 64. See id. at 706. 
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managers comfortable.”65  From an institutional choice perspective, 
the SEC’s decision to table its own proposal implied a belief that the 
ABA, not the SEC, was the proper institution for the regulation-
drafting role at that time.66 
In 1983, the American Bar Association revised an earlier version of 
its primary confidentiality rule, Model Rule 1.6, to allow for 
disclosure of client confidences to prevent a crime resulting in death 
or serious injury, but not to prevent or mitigate the effects of financial 
or property-related crimes.67  Believing that the ABA’s final 
formulation of Model Rule 1.6 created a haven for white-collar 
criminals, United States Senator Arlen Specter introduced a bill in 
the Senate that would make the prior version of Model Rule 1.6 
(allowing for disclosure of client confidences to prevent financial 
crimes, not just death or bodily harm) into federal criminal law.68 
In response, “even the bar leaders who had opposed the 
amendment to Rule 1.6 in the ABA House of Delegates opposed the 
Specter bill, arguing that lawyers are and should be regulated at the 
state level and by courts, not legislatures.”69  The bar leaders believed 
that “Congress, as a matter of policy, should leave even this non-
litigation aspect of law practice to the governance of the state 
supreme courts, which could be expected to show more deference 
than Congress to the ABA rule.”70  The Specter amendment was 
withdrawn, and states were able to rely on the ABA’s formulation of 
Model Rule 1.6 in enacting their own binding confidentiality 
regulations.71  Here, Congress’ deferral to the ABA’s rule-drafters 
(and by implication, state courts) acted as an implicit acceptance of 
the ABA’s leading role in the matter of drafting confidentiality rules 
for the legal profession.  This ICT-based argument in opposition to 
the Specter amendment clearly played an important role in the 
ABA’s maintenance of rulemaking authority over attorney-client 
confidentiality.72 
                                                                                                                                         
 65. Id. 
 66. See id. 
 67. See id. at 713. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Ted Schneyer, supra note 15, at 43. 
 71. See id. 
 72. See id. (noting that “assumptions about the relative competence of the ABA 
and other standard setters play a vital role in ABA rulemaking”). 
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b. The Promulgation of SEC Rule 205.3 
The SEC and ABA rule-drafters again found themselves at odds in 
2002 over the SEC’s promulgation of SEC Rule 205.3 and its 
proposed “noisy withdrawal” provision.73  In the wake of the Enron 
and Worldcom scandals, Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 
which mandated in part that the SEC create new attorney 
confidentiality rules allowing corporate attorneys more leeway in 
reporting clients’ financial frauds.74  Pursuant to this delegation of 
authority, the SEC enacted Rule 205.3(d), which allows attorneys to 
reveal the confidential information of their clients to prevent or 
mitigate financial fraud in some circumstances.75  Additionally, the 
SEC proposed a “noisy withdrawal” provision, which would have 
required corporate attorneys to withdraw from representation of a 
client, and announce the withdrawal to the SEC, upon discovery of 
client fraud in certain circumstances.76 
At the time, the primary ABA Model Rule addressing this conduct 
(Rule 1.6(b)), allowed attorneys to disclose client confidences to 
prevent crimes likely to result in death or serious bodily injury, but 
not crimes resulting in purely financial injury.77  In fact, the ABA had 
recently rejected an amendment of its own that proposed expansion 
of the confidentiality exception to allow for the reporting of client 
fraud.78  As a result of the outcry connected to the Enron and 
Worldcom collapse, the ABA agreed to reconsider its position on 
lawyers’ responsibility to report, or “blow the whistle,” on clients’ 
fraud.79 
In a compromise between the SEC and the organized bar, the SEC 
tabled its “noisy withdrawal” rules pending further consideration.80  
The SEC limited its finalized regulation, SEC Rule 205.3, to allow for 
                                                                                                                                         
 73. See Clifton Barnes, ABA, States, and SEC Hash Out Lawyers’ Responsibility 
In Corporate Settings, A.B.A., http://www.americanbar.org/publications/bar_leader/
2003_04/2802/corporate.html (last visited May 15, 2015). 
 74. Id. 
 75. 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(d)(2) (2014); see also Barry R. Temkin & Ben Moskovits, 
Lawyers As Whistleblowers Under the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform Act: Ethical 
Conflicts Under the Rules of Professional Conduct and SEC Rules, 84 N.Y. ST. B.J. 
10, 14 (2012). 
 76. See Barnes, supra note 73. 
 77. See STEPHEN GILLERS & ROY D. SIMON, REGULATION OF LAWYERS: 
STATUTES AND STANDARDS 80–81 (ed. 2007). 
 78. See LISA G. LERMAN & PHILIP G. SCHRAG, ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN THE 
PRACTICE OF LAW 212–13 (3d ed. 2012). 
 79. See id. 
 80. Id. 
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the reporting of client frauds using confidential information under 
certain circumstances, but it did not mandate the reporting or “noisy 
withdrawal.” 81  The ABA, in turn, amended its Model Rule 1.6(b) to 
correspondingly broaden its exceptions to confidentiality rules by 
allowing attorneys to report client financial frauds using otherwise 
confidential client information (rather than only to report crimes 
resulting in death or serious bodily harm).82  
c. The Second Circuit Decision in United States v. Quest 
Diagnostics, Inc. 
The 2013 Second Circuit opinion in United States v. Quest 
Diagnostics, Inc.83 provides a more recent example of how the choice 
of regulatory institution can affect the creation and application of 
confidentiality rules.84  The plaintiffs in Quest brought a federal False 
Claims Act (FCA) suit against defendant Quest Diagnostics, claiming 
that the medical diagnostics laboratory engaged in illegal kickbacks 
by underpricing some of its services in order to obtain other federally 
funded business.85  The principal plaintiff, Mark Bibi, based his 
kickback allegations in part on confidential information he had 
obtained from the defendant through his years of service as the 
defendant’s in-house counsel.86  Bibi first argued that the broad 
disclosure of his former client’s confidential information was 
permitted under New York’s Rule of Professional Conduct 1.6(b)(2) 
(NY RPC 1.6(b)(2)), which permits an attorney to “reveal or use 
confidential information to the extent that the lawyer reasonably 
believes necessary . . . to prevent the client from committing a 
crime . . .”87  However, the court made it clear that Bibi’s disclosures 
                                                                                                                                         
 81. Susan P. Koniak, When the Hurlyburly’s Done: The Bar’s Struggle with the 
SEC, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1236, 1270 (2003) (noting the ABA’s active campaign 
against the “noisy withdrawal” provision). 
 82. See LERMAN & SCHRAG, supra note 78, at 212–13. It is important to note that, 
despite the ABA’s broadening of the whistleblowing exceptions to Model Rule 1.6, 
application of the exceptions is still limited to situations where the attorney’s services 
were used in furtherance of the fraud. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT 
R. 1.6(b)(2)–(3) (2014). 
 83. See generally 734 F.3d 154 (2d Cir. 2013). 
 84. As will be shown, the Quest opinion represents an appellate panel’s choice to 
entrust regulation of a particular type of attorney behavior to a state judiciary rather 
than the federal Congress. See infra notes 100–01 and accompanying text; see also 
Nourse & Shaffer, supra note 25, at 107 n.205 (noting that judges make “institutional 
choices” when determining which rule to apply in a given situation). 
 85. Quest Diagnostics, Inc., 734 F.3d at 159–161. 
 86. Id. at 159–62. 
 87. See id. at 164; N.Y. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT 1.6(b)(2) (2014). 
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went far beyond what would have been “reasonably necessary” under 
NY RPC 16.(b)(2), and thus would have constituted a violation of the 
ethics rule, if it were to apply here.88 
To the extent that his wide-ranging disclosures went beyond what 
was permitted under NY RPC 1.6(b)(2) as “reasonably necessary” 
under the circumstances, Bibi argued that NY RPC 1.6(b)(2)’s 
“reasonable necessity” limitation should not apply.89  This is because, 
he argued, NY RPC 1.6(b)(2) is preempted by 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(2) 
of the federal False Claims Act.90  Rather than limiting potential 
disclosures to those which are necessary to prevent or disclose fraud, 
§ 3730(b)(2) requires a potential False Claims Act plaintiff to make 
disclosure of “substantially all material evidence and information the 
person possesses” as a prerequisite to a successful FCA claim.91  Bibi 
argued that the application of FCA’s “substantially all material 
evidence” standard would allow for the disclosure of a far broader 
range of confidential information than would be permitted under the 
New York conduct rules.92  In asking the court to apply the FCA 
standard, Bibi believed he should be allowed to move forward with 
his FCA complaint based on his broad disclosure of confidential 
client information.93  Bibi’s argument effectively forced the court to 
decide whether to apply NY RPC 1.6(b)(2) and its restrictive 
“reasonable necessity” standard, or the FCA and its broader 
“substantially all material evidence” standard to Bibi’s disclosures.94 
In determining which rule to apply, the Second Circuit 
acknowledged what Komesar would call a “goal choice” problem.95  
The court noted that “the central purpose of the N.Y. Rules—to 
protect client confidences—can be inconsistent with or antithetical to 
federal interests, which under the FCA, are to encourage private 
individuals who are aware of fraud being perpetrated against the 
                                                                                                                                         
 88. See Quest Diagnostics, Inc., 734 F.3d at 165. 
 89. Id. at 164. 
 90. Id.  Preemption creates additional questions of its own, which are beyond the 
scope of this Note.  This Note assumes away any constitutional issues with 
preemption, and analyzes the state-vs.-federal law issue solely from a public policy 
perspective. 
 91. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(2) (2012). 
 92. Quest Diagnostics, Inc., 734 F.3d at 164–65. 
 93. Id. at 165. 
 94. Id. at 164–65. 
 95. Komesar recognized a goal choice problem under similar circumstances—
where a court was forced to decide between two rules supporting two different social 
goals. See KOMESAR supra note 14, at 14–28 (analyzing Boomer v. Atlantic Cement 
Company, 26 N.Y.2d 219(1970)). 
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government to bring such information forward.”96  The plaintiff asked 
the court to prioritize the goal of encouraging whistleblowers to come 
forward in cases like this by applying the FCA’s “substantially all 
material evidence” standard, while the defendants asked the court to 
prioritize the goal of protecting stronger lawyer-client confidentiality 
by applying the more narrow “reasonable necessity” standard.97 
However, the court did not to enter into a detailed “goal choice” 
analysis of these competing social interests, nor did it provide its own 
view regarding which underlying goal should be prioritized in this 
situation.98  Rather, the court merely stated that the New York ethics 
rule’s “reasonable necessity” standard “implicitly accounts for the 
federal interests at stake in the FCA,” so it “need not give way to 
section 3730(b)(2)’s requirement of full disclosure of material 
evidence.”99  Thus, the Second Circuit resolved the problem in Quest 
with what Komesar would call an “institutional choice” decision.100  
The court’s deferral to NY RPC 1.6(b)(2) regarding the proper 
balance of state and federal interests suggests a belief on the part of 
the panel that the institution responsible for the drafting of NY RPC 
1.6 (the New York state court system) was more competent than 
Congress, or the panel itself, to regulate lawyers’ behavior in the 
particular context discussed in Quest.101 
However, the Quest court’s institutional choice analysis appears 
superficial at best, including only cursory policy analysis in support of 
its decision.102  For the Quest court to maximize the public policy 
benefits of its decision regarding “which rule to apply” to Bibi’s 
behavior situation, ICT would suggest that the court would first need 
a more rigorous analysis of “which institution should govern” 
                                                                                                                                         
 96. Quest Diagnostics, Inc., 734 F.3d at 163 (internal quotations and citations 
omitted). 
 97. See id. at 164. 
 98. C.f. KOMESAR, supra note 14, at 16–17 (noting the Boomer majority and 
minority’s “goal choice” disagreement). 
 99. Quest Diagnostics, Inc., 734 F.3d at 164.  The court thus chose to apply NY 
RPC 1.6(b)(2), and held that Bibi’s disclosures violated the rule by being broader 
than reasonably necessary to prevent the defendant’s alleged fraud.  The case was 
dismissed, and the plaintiffs were barred from bringing any future cases based on 
Bibi’s disclosures. Id. at 165. 
 100. C.f. KOMESAR, supra note 14, at 23–24 (noting that the Boomer majority and 
minority’s “goal choice” disagreement was solved by an “institutional choice” 
decision). 
 101. C.f. Schneyer, supra note 26, at 33-34 (presenting the argument that particular 
institutions should perform certain tasks based on their relative strengths and 
weaknesses).  
 102. See Quest Diagnostics, Inc., 734 F.3d at 164 (noting that New York Rule of 
Conduct 1.6 “implicitly accounts for the federal interests at stake”). 
2015] ATTORNEY-WHISTLEBLOWING 985 
behavior like Bibi’s in the first place.  Thus, from a public policy 
perspective, the result would be enhanced by a comparative 
institutional choice discussion analyzing the following question: What 
are the relative strengths and weaknesses of the New York state court 
system, the federal courts, and congress, in weighing the importance 
of protecting client confidences against the importance of 
encouraging anti-fraud whistleblowing? 
2. Attorney Conduct Rulemaking Process’s Need for More 
Rigorous Institutional Choice Analysis 
a. Lack of Rigorous Public Policy Analysis and the Rules’ 
Relevance in a Growing and Evolving Legal Industry 
The legal industry has seen substantial change over time.  For 
example, while legal practice in the nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries revolved around litigation, the vast majority of lawyers 
today rarely see the inside of a courtroom.103  Additionally, the unified 
nature of the legal industry has long since given way to diversification 
and specialization of individual practice areas.104  Scholars have noted 
a drastic shift in the economics of legal practice: where lawyers once 
possessed specialized legal knowledge unique to members of the bar, 
many sophisticated corporate clients now have their own law 
departments and in-house counsel providing them with competing 
sources of legal advice.105 
However, ethics rules governing the practice of law have failed to 
keep pace with these structural changes in the legal industry.106  
Scholars argue that, as a result, many aspects of the current ethics 
                                                                                                                                         
 103. Eli Wald, Should Judges Regulate Lawyers?, supra note 5, at 153 (quoting  
Charles W. Wolfram, Lawyer Turf and Lawyer Regulation—the Role of the Inherent 
Powers Doctrine, 12 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 1, 5 (1989–1990)); see also Terry 
Carter, The Endangered Trial Lawyer, A.B.A. JOURNAL (Mar. 2, 2009, 04:30 AM), 
http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/the_endangered_trial_lawyer (noting a 
decrease in both the number of trials and seasoned trial attorneys in recent years). 
 104. See Wald, Resizing the Rules of Professional Conduct, supra note 8, at 244 
(noting that “as the practice of law grows increasingly specialized, even lawyers in the 
same practice area may have uniquely distinguishable practices”).  The practice of 
personal injury law, for example, now bears little in common with the practice of 
securities law before the SEC.  Similarly, the practice of a modern-day solo 
practitioner has little in common with the practice of a corporate transactional 
attorney. See Wilkins, supra note 15, at 817. 
 105. Peter C. Kostant, Sacred Cows or Cash Cows: The Abuse of Rhetoric in 
Justifying Some Current Norms of Transactional Lawyering, 36 WAKE FOREST L. 
REV. 49, 93–94 (2001). 
 106. See Wilkins, supra note 6, at 479. 
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rulemaking regime are based on outdated assumptions of the past, 
rather than characteristics of the modern legal industry.107  For 
example, some scholars criticize the “one-size-fits-all” nature of 
modern ethics rules, which are intended to apply to every facet of 
legal practice despite vast differences between specific legal 
disciplines.108  To combat such anachronisms in the ethics rulemaking 
process and develop more relevant and effective rules, decision-
makers should pay closer attention to the public policy and 
institutional choice implications of ethics rules throughout the 
drafting and application process.109 
b. Lack of Public Policy Analysis in the Confusing and 
Contradictory Nature of Ethics Rules 
The lack of public policy analysis in the drafting of modern ethics 
rules, combined with the continued maintenance of the “one-size-fits-
all” ethics regime, has also played a role in the overwhelming 
complexity of the current rulemaking regime.110  Ethics rules purport 
to cover a vast range of attorney behaviors and ethical situations.  
However, state high courts responsible for adopting the rules are 
rarely clear about the practical effect those rules should have on 
lower courts or disciplinary committees when ruling on specific 
instances of attorney conduct.111  Some courts have been hesitant to 
apply sanctions or hold attorneys liable for their conduct even after 
conclusively determining that they had violated a particular rule of 
professional conduct.112  Conversely, others have applied a broad 
range of sanctions for violations of conduct rules.113  While ethics rule-
                                                                                                                                         
 107. Id. (noting that, while ethics rules have changed over time, the older and more 
traditional structure of the industry “continue[s] to shape the direction of 
contemporary developments” in ethics regulation). 
 108. See, e.g., Jack T. Camp, Thoughts on Professionalism in the Twenty-First 
Century, 81 TUL. L. REV. 1377, 1381 (2007) (noting that with the vast traditional, 
ethical, and moral differences within the modern legal profession, “agreeing to a 
single uniform definition of professionalism becomes impossible”); Wald, Resizing 
the Rules of Professional Conduct, supra note 8, at 228 (noting that critics have long 
called for “the promulgation of rules of conduct more in tune with and sensitive to 
the increasingly diverse realities practicing lawyers face”). 
 109. Wald, Should Judges Regulate Lawyers?, supra note 5, at 153–54 (noting that 
“the evolution and growth of law practice demands close scrutiny of judicial 
regulation of lawyers”). 
 110. Wald, Should Judges Regulate Lawyers?, supra note 5, at 167 (labeling 
attorney ethics rules as a “complex web of uncertainty”). 
 111. See Zacharias & Green, supra note 2, at 77 (noting that state courts often take 
contradictory approaches when applying ethics rules in particular cases) 
 112. See id. 
 113. See id. at 83. 
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makers may have legitimate reasons for providing such a wide variety 
of standards for attorney conduct, the practice can tend to lead to 
confusing and inconsistent results.114 
Problems with the ethics rules’ effectiveness, consistency, and 
relevance are further exacerbated by the presence of a growing 
number of institutional actors who have assumed some role in 
attorney conduct regulation.115  For example, in 2002 Congress 
enacted § 307 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which gave the SEC 180 
days to promulgate rules “establishing minimum standards of conduct 
for attorneys representing public companies before the SEC.”116  
Pursuant to § 307, the SEC promulgated its own rule, § 205.3, which 
allows attorneys to report the past financial fraud of corporate clients 
in certain circumstances.117 
This complexity creates a daunting barrier to the effective 
application of institutional choice analysis to the field of attorney 
conduct regulation.  At the same time, the confusing and 
unpredictable nature of the current regime of attorney conduct rules 
is a main reason that an institutional analysis of the field is so 
important.  In describing how best to create or apply an attorney 
conduct rule to achieve a desired result, institutional choice can help 
designers of the rules create a more coherent regime of conduct 
regulation, and help regulators themselves apply the rules more 
consistently and with greater effect.118 
C. Institutional Choice Analysis and Attorney Whistleblowing 
Regulations 
1. Institutional Choice Analysis on Attorney Whistleblower 
Regulations, and Need for More Rigorous Analysis 
Choices between competing regulatory institutions have prominent 
roles in both the creation and application of attorney-client 
confidentiality rules over the last thirty years.  While institutional 
                                                                                                                                         
 114. See id at 136. 
 115. See Wilkins, supra note 15, at 803 (discussing the rise in alternative systems of 
lawyer regulation and regulatory enforcement). 
 116. See 15 U.S.C. § 7245 (2002); David J. Beck, The Legal Profession at the 
Crossroads: Who Will Write the Future Rules Governing the Conduct of Lawyers 
Representing Public Corporations?, 34 ST. MARY’S L.J. 873, 875 (2003). 
 117. See 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(d)(2)(iii) (2014). 
 118. See Dzienkowski, supra note 111, at 85 (noting that “it is desirable for society 
to regulate lawyers under a code of ethics that guides lawyers to make consistent 
decisions when confronted with the same ethical issues; thus, consistency is an 
important objective of ethics rule design”). 
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choice decisions have helped the ABA, SEC, Congress, and federal 
courts further their chosen social goals, these examples also suggest 
that the policy analysis behind such decisions has been far from 
rigorous.  Institutional choice decisions like the ones discussed supra 
have been driven as much by political realities, self-interest, and 
public opinion, as they have by reasoned public policy analysis.119  
Given this need for more thorough public-policy analysis by the 
relevant institutional decision-makers, and the obvious historical 
importance of institutional choice theory, it is surprising to find that 
the body of scholarship actually comparing the relative competence of 
attorney-conduct-rule-drafting institutions is sparse.120 
Professor David Wilkins published what is considered by many to 
be the pioneering study of institutional choice in the legal ethics 
context.121  In his 1992 Harvard Law Review article, Wilkins argued 
that scandals like the Lincoln Savings and Loan crisis,122 in which 
lawyer malfeasance was implicated, combined with the significant 
growth and change of the American legal industry, created a need to 
rethink the efficacy of the current lawyer-controlled system of 
attorney conduct regulation.123  Wilkins divided the field of attorney 
conduct regulation into two distinct sub-categories—rule creation and 
rule enforcement—focusing his attention on a public policy analysis 
of the “rule enforcement” category.124  He then proceeded to provide 
a framework for what such a public policy review might look like, 
further dividing rule enforcement into smaller categories and 
comparing characteristics of the different institutions which could be 
responsible for regulation of each aspect of attorney conduct.125 
Professor Benjamin Barton took up the task of conducting a 
comparative institutional analysis of rule creation, the second of 
Wilkins’ two sub-categories.126  Barton’s study took a top-down 
                                                                                                                                         
 119. See Schneyer, supra note 6, at 677. 
 120. Barton, supra note 34, at 1173–74 (“The few commentators who have 
addressed this question have approached it as a matter of doctrine, i.e., whether the 
“inherent authority” claimed by state supreme courts is a proper reading of state 
constitutional law, or have treated the topic glancingly.”). 
 121. See Schneyer, supra note 15, at 34; Wilkins, supra note 15. 
 122. The Lincoln Savings and Loan crisis involved the rapid collapse of a large 
bank due to widespread financial fraud. See Wilkins, supra note 15, at 868 n.302. 
 123. See id. at 802–03. 
 124. Id. at 803–04. 
 125. Id.  Because this Note focuses on the other sub-category of attorney conduct 
regulation—rule creation—the precise details of Wilkins’ framework are not directly 
relevant to this study. 
 126. See Barton, supra note 34, at 1167.  Benjamin Barton is a professor of law at 
University of Tennessee College of Law. Benjamin Barton, U. TENN. KNOXVILLE, 
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approach to attorney behavior regulation, analyzing the relative 
strengths and weaknesses of several institutions which could be 
responsible for such rule creation as a whole.127  He compared the 
institutions along three interrelated goals of attorney conduct 
regulation: limiting the potential for rent-seeking, maximizing 
procedural efficiency, and democratization.128  In conclusion, Barton 
found that “although each institution has substantial weaknesses that 
likely will result in lawyer dominance of the regulatory process, a 
legislative body—either Congress or state legislatures—would be 
more likely to produce public-minded regulation and limit lawyer 
rent-seeking.”129 
2. Framework of Comparative Institutional Choice Microanalysis in 
Future Institutional Analysis 
As the number of parties involved in the dispute and the 
complexity of their interaction grows, a court’s institutional choice 
becomes more and more complicated.130  More parties means higher 
transaction costs and less predictable outcomes, which detracts from 
the ability of courts to craft efficient regulations over the social 
behavior in question.131  The increasing breadth and complexity of the 
regulated behavior also makes scholars’ institutional choice analysis 
in those areas more complex.132 
Comparative institutional choice analysis thus becomes more 
challenging to apply to specific factual scenarios as the relevant social 
issues and institutions grow in complexity.133  This difficulty highlights 
the limitations of Komesar’s and Wilkins’ analyses, which the scholars 
have acknowledged.134  Their broad frameworks were not intended to 
                                                                                                                                         
http://law.utk.edu/people/benjamin-barton/ (last visited May 15, 2015).  His work on 
public policy and the legal industry is widely cited by scholars in many related 
disciplines. 
 127. Barton, supra note 34, at 1171 (“Given the existence of a regulatory problem, 
this Article assesses lawyer regulation from the top down.”). 
 128. See id. at 1177. 
 129. See id. at 1175. 
 130. See KOMESAR, supra note 14, at 22. 
 131. Id. 
 132. See id.; Rubin, supra note 11, at 1425 (“[T]he conceptual complexity of 
drawing upon several disciplines may become unmanageable unless the range of 
discourse remains limited.”). 
 133. Shaffer, supra note 13, at 608 (“Komesar’s analytic framework necessarily 
calls for close empirical understanding and microanalysis of institutional processes in 
particular contexts.”). 
 134. See, e.g., Neil K. Komesar, The Perils of Pandora: Further Reflections on 
Institutional Choice, 22 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 999, 1003 (1997) (“[I]t would be 
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be applied directly to any given policy decision, but rather were 
provided as overviews of institutional choice concepts to be further 
developed and applied to particular situations by future public policy 
analyses.135 
Some scholars have argued that meeting the challenge of real-
world application requires narrowing the scope of a comparative 
institutional analysis to very limited, fact-specific contexts.136  
Professor Edward Rubin,137 who terms this context-specific 
application “institutional microanalysis,” suggests that such narrow 
application is necessary in applying institutional choice analysis to 
specific regulatory fields such as attorney conduct regulation.138  This 
is in part because attorney conduct regulations have different results 
when applied to different factual situations; broad analyses 
purporting to cover such wide-ranging regulations would be far less 
effective at predicting a particular regulatory outcome.139  For these 
reasons, this Note adopts Professor Rubin’s “microanalysis” 
framework in applying Komesar’s, Wilkins’, and Barton’s broader 
institutional analyses to the specific area of attorney-whistleblowing 
regulations.140 
                                                                                                                                         
impossible for me to set out and examine the virtually infinite number of public 
policy settings and problems that might be amenable to this analysis.  I did not intend 
the book to be an encyclopedia of institutional choice; I was only writing the preface 
to that encyclopedia and trying to convince others to contribute various volumes and 
sections.”). 
 135. Id.; see also Schneyer, supra note 15, at 34 (“[R]egulatory institutions now 
vary so much in structure and operation that if policy makers are to assign tasks 
wisely, they often need more finely grained comparisons than broad categories 
allow.”). 
 136. Rubin, supra note 11, at 1425 (“[T]he conceptual complexity of drawing upon 
several disciplines may become unmanageable unless the range of discourse remains 
limited.”); see also Shaffer, supra note 13, at 608. 
 137. Edward Rubin is a professor of law and political science at Vanderbilt 
University Law School. Edward L. Rubin, VAND. L. SCH., 
http://law.vanderbilt.edu/bio/edward-rubin (last visited May 15, 2015).  His work 
applying economics and social science concepts to legal and institutional analysis is 
widely cited and discussed by scholars of legal analysis. 
 138. Rubin, supra note 11, at 1425 (noting that context-specificity is important in 
institutional choice because “law involves aspects of social institutions that operate at 
the particularized level”) 
 139. See David B. Wilkins, Making Context Count: Regulating Lawyers After 
Kaye, Scholer, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 1145, 1152 (1993) (criticizing the “broadly stated 
principles” declared by previous iterations of attorney conduct regulations). 
 140. Wilkins, supra note 6, at 492 (concluding that “the study of the legal 
profession, therefore, must center around the microanalysis of institutions”) (internal 
quotations and ellipses omitted). 
2015] ATTORNEY-WHISTLEBLOWING 991 
II.  CONDUCTING A COMPARATIVE INSTITUTIONAL 
MICROANALYSIS OF ATTORNEY-WHISTLEBLOWING 
REGULATIONS: WHAT DATA DO WE NEED? 
As discussed supra Part I, some preliminary information is 
required before a thorough comparative institutional analysis can be 
conducted.  First, because institutional microanalysis is so context-
specific, the relevant factual scenario must be understood in 
significant detail.141  The social goals and interests at stake in that 
context must then be analyzed.142  Based on that understanding, the 
range of institutions which play some role in regulating those social 
goals and interests must be determined.143  And finally, the 
institutional characteristics most relevant to achieving those goals 
must be set out and understood.144  This Part lays out this required 
background information for a comparative institutional analysis of 
the hypothetical legislature-judiciary debate presented by the 
Introduction to this Note. 
A. The Regulatory Context to Which this Note’s Microanalysis 
Will Be Applied 
The hypothetical situation presented in the Introduction to this 
Note establishes a situation in which a state’s legislature seeks to 
enact a regulation determining the circumstances under which an 
attorney must disclose otherwise confidential client information in 
order to prevent or remedy a client’s fraud.145  The state judiciary, on 
the other hand, has already enacted a similar rule that does not 
“require” reporting of such confidences, but only “permits” it under 
certain circumstances.146 
The context of this Note’s “microanalysis” is relatively narrow in 
that it deals only with the specific sub-field of attorney conduct 
regulation relating to confidentiality and whistleblowing 
regulations.147  However, it is very broad in that the analysis assumes 
                                                                                                                                         
 141. See supra notes 137–40 and accompanying text. 
 142. See supra notes 38–44 and accompanying text. 
 143. See supra notes 45–55 and accompanying text. 
 144. See supra note 25 and accompanying text. 
 145. See supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
 146. While such conflict would inevitably raise additional practical and 
constitutional difficulties, this hypothetical assumes those issues away for the sake of 
focusing on the public policy concerns at stake. 
 147. There are many levels of specificity at which this “microanalysis” could be 
conducted.  For example, one could chose to analyze a) institutions’ capacity to 
regulate attorney conduct in general; b) institutions’ capacity to regulate attorney 
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that state institutions share common characteristics across all 
jurisdictions, and is thus meant to apply generally across all U.S. 
jurisdictions.  Thus, where the practice of law and the makeup of 
governing institutions are shared by individual states, the lessons of 
this analysis can be generalized across those jurisdictions.148 
B. The Social Goals Implicated by Attorney-Whistleblowing 
Regulation 
1. A Lawyer’s Ethical Duty of Confidentiality 
Current regulations governing attorney-whistleblowing revolve 
primarily around the doctrine of attorneys’ ethical duty to maintain 
client confidences.149  The centrality of this ethical duty within the 
practice of law is discussed in Comment 2 of the American Bar 
Association’s Model Rule of Professional Conduct 1.6, which calls a 
lawyer’s duty to protect client confidentiality “a fundamental 
principle in the client-lawyer relationship.”150  The ABA broadly 
defines the scope of confidential information as “all information 
relating to the representation, whatever its source.”151 
                                                                                                                                         
conduct relating specifically to types of behavior like whistleblowing; or c) 
institutions’ capacity to regulate an attorney’s ability to blow the whistle on a past 
client where that client was also his employer (e.g., the lawyer was in-house counsel).  
This Note’s analysis applies a “middle-level” of specificity to avoid challenges that 
would arise from either over-specificity or over-generalization: if the analysis is too 
general, its results could not practically be applied to any particular context; if the 
analysis is too narrow, then its results would vary drastically case-by-case, leading to 
conflicting and inefficient results. See, e.g., David B. Wilkins, Legal Realism for 
Lawyers, 104 HARV. L. REV. 468, 515–17 (1990). 
 148. Significantly, in the context of creating attorney-whistleblower regulations, 
several states’ institutions do differ materially from others—they may thus merit their 
own independent analyses.  These states, including New York and Delaware, are 
dealt with in more detail in Part III. 
 149. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(d)(2)(iii) (2014); MODEL RULES OF PROF’L 
CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2014); NEW YORK RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(2) (2014). 
 150. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6, cmt. 2 (2003); see also Daniel R. 
Fischel, Lawyers and Confidentiality, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 1 (1998) (arguing that 
“confidentiality is the bedrock principle of legal ethics”). 
 151. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6, cmt. 3 (2003).  While the lawyer’s 
duty of confidentiality is often conflated with the related doctrine of attorney-client 
privilege, this definition makes it clear that the doctrine of confidentiality is far 
broader in scope than attorney-client privilege.  For example, the ethical duty of 
confidentiality covers “information gained during the course of representation, while 
the privilege protects only specific “communications between a lawyer and client.” 
See STEPHEN GILLERS, REGULATION OF LAWYERS 28–29 (6th ed. 2002).  Thus, 
“much information that is ethically protected [by the confidentiality doctrine] will not 
be privileged because the source of the information was not the client or its agents.” 
Id.; see also MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6, cmt. 3 (2003). 
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Proponents of strict confidentiality rules argue that such 
protections are vital to the proper functioning of American legal 
practice.152  This is, they assert, in part because advice from lawyers is 
essential in ensuring that individuals are able to act in accordance 
with the complex laws and regulations that they might not otherwise 
appreciate or understand.153  Many lawyers argue that this advice is 
only accurate and effective if clients are able to share the potentially 
damaging details of their legal situations in confidence.154  In such 
situations (argues the ABA), “lawyers know that almost all clients 
follow the advice given, and the law is upheld.”155 
The most influential formulation of the rule governing an 
attorney’s ethical duty of confidentiality is the ABA’s Model Rule of 
Professional Conduct 1.6.156  Model Rule 1.6 generally requires 
lawyers to maintain the confidentiality of client information learned 
during the course of the lawyer’s representation.157  The full extent of 
confidentiality protections provided by this rule is made clear by the 
scope of its exceptions.  Model Rule 1.6(b), for example, provides 
seven such exceptions that potentially limit an attorney’s 
confidentiality obligations and allow him to disclose the confidential 
information of a client or former client.158  Most relevant to this Note 
are 1.6(b)(2) and 1.6(b)(3), which were added to Model Rule 1.6 in 
2003 in the wake of the Enron and Worldcom scandals.159 
Rule 1.6(b)(2) and 1.6(b)(3) deal with a lawyer’s ability to disclose 
client confidences to prevent a client’s future financial crime, or 
rectify one that has already taken place.  The relevant portions of 
these provisions read as follows: 
                                                                                                                                         
 152. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6, cmt. 3 (2003). 
 153. See Norman W. Spaulding, Compliance, Creative Deviance, and Resistance to 
Law: A Theory of the Attorney-Client Privilege, 2013 J. PROF. LAW. 135, 151 (2013) 
(“Almost without exception, clients come to lawyers in order to determine what their 
rights are and what is, in the maze of laws and regulations, deemed to be legal and 
correct.”) (quoting the Comment to Model Rule 1.6 of the 1983 Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct). 
 154. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6, cmt. 2 (2003). 
 155. Id. 
 156. See Wilkins, supra note 15, at 810; see generally MODEL RULES OF PROF’L 
CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2014).  Even though the Model Rules do not have the force of law 
in any jurisdiction, many states have enacted the language of Model Rule 1.6 into law 
as is; others adopted it with minor changes. Wilkins, supra note 15, at 810. 
 157. Temkin & Moskovits, supra note 75, at 16 (“The ABA Model Rules require 
lawyers to maintain the confidentiality of information learned by the lawyer in the 
course of the representation.”). 
 158. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b) (2014). 
 159. See Temkin & Moskovits, supra note 75, at 16; see also supra Part I.B.1.b. 
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(b) A lawyer may reveal information relating to the representation 
of a client to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary: 
. . . . 
(2) to prevent the client from committing a crime or fraud that is 
reasonably certain to result in substantial injury to the financial 
interests or property of another and in furtherance of which the 
client has used or is using the lawyer’s services; 
(3) to prevent, mitigate or rectify substantial injury to the 
financial interests or property of another that is reasonably 
certain to result or has resulted from the client’s commission of 
a crime or fraud in furtherance of which the client has used the 
lawyer’s services . . . 160 
The permissive language of Rule 1.6 (“a lawyer may reveal . . . ”) 
provides an attorney with discretion to make her own determination 
whether to report client confidences and provides the circumstances 
under which she may do so.161  The rule limits permissible disclosures 
to those “the lawyer reasonably believes necessary” under the 
circumstances, which ostensibly provides some guidance as to how 
much information an attorney may disclose.162 
Many jurisdictions base the language of their confidentiality rules 
on the ABA rule’s formulation.163  For example, New York Rule of 
Professional Conduct 1.6 is the primary rule regulating an attorney’s 
duty of confidentiality while practicing law in the state of New 
York.164  NY RPC 1.6 maintains the permissive language of the Model 
Rule, but allows for a reporting of client confidences under broader, 
and less-well-defined circumstances.165 
The relevant portion of the law reads as follows: 
(b) A lawyer may reveal or use confidential information to the 
extent that the lawyer reasonably believes necessary: 
. . . . 
(2) to prevent the client from committing a crime.166 
NY RPC 1.6 is thus both broader and narrower than the ABA 
Model Rule.167  Primarily, the New York rule provides for the 
                                                                                                                                         
 160. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b) (2014). 
 161. See id. (emphasis added). 
 162. Id. 
 163. See Zacharias & Green, supra note 2, at 94 (discussing the process by which 
states formulate their rules of professional conduct). 
 164. Unlike the ABA Model Rule, which courts look to only as persuasive 
authority, NY RPC 1.6 has been enacted as law and is thus authoritative in the state. 
 165. Temkin & Moskovits, supra note 75, at 16. 
 166. N.Y. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(2) (2014). 
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reporting of otherwise confidential information to “prevent the client 
from committing a crime,” with no requirement that the lawyer’s 
assistance be used in furtherance, like in the equivalent ABA rule.168  
However, NY RPC 1.6 only allows for disclosure of confidences to 
prevent a future crime, and provides no exception to allow for the 
mitigation or rectification of past crimes.169 
In contrast to the broad discretion provided to attorneys in 
deciding whether to report client confidences under NY RPC 1.6(b), 
New Jersey’s relevant confidentiality rule affirmatively requires 
attorneys to report client confidences in certain situations.  The 
relevant provision reads: 
(b) A lawyer shall reveal such [confidential] information to the 
proper authorities, as soon as, and to the extent the lawyer 
reasonably believes necessary, to prevent the client or another 
person: 
(1) from committing a criminal, illegal or fraudulent act that the 
lawyer reasonably believes is likely to result in death or 
substantial bodily harm or substantial injury to the financial 
interest or property of another . . . .170 
Like the New York rule, New Jersey’s Rule of Professional 
Conduct 1.6 provides an exception to its confidentiality rule only to 
prevent future crimes, not to mitigate or rectify past crimes.171  
However, its mandatory language also removes all discretion from the 
attorney in deciding whether or not to make use of this exception in 
reporting confidences in the face of client fraud.172 
Another important rule defining an attorney’s ethical duty of 
confidentiality is ABA Rule of Professional Responsibility 1.13, 
succinctly titled “Organization as Client.”173  Model Rule 1.13 
addresses what measures an attorney may take when they discover 
potentially harmful misconduct occurring within a client 
organization.174  It states that, when a lawyer discovers such 
misconduct in the client organization, the lawyer should first report 
                                                                                                                                         
 167. See Temkin & Moskovits, supra note 75, at 16. 
 168. N.Y. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2014). 
 169. See id. 
 170. N.J. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b) (2014). 
 171. See id. 
 172. Id.; Temkin & Moskovits, supra note 75, at 17. 
 173. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.13 (2014). 
 174. See Nicole Kroetsch & Samantha Petrich, Task Force on Corporate 
Responsibility: Should the American Bar Association Adopt New Ethics Rules?, 16 
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 727, 733 (2003). 
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such wrongdoing up to the client’s top management.175  If, however, 
top management fails to act in a timely or appropriate manner to 
address the issue, and the lawyer reasonably believes that the 
wrongdoing will result in injury to the client organization, then “the 
lawyer may reveal information relating to the representation whether 
or not Rule 1.6 permits such disclosure, but only if and to the extent 
the lawyer reasonably believes necessary to prevent substantial injury 
to the organization.”176 
Rule 1.13 thus provides an additional, if limited, exception to the 
Model Rules’ confidentiality requirements.177  It permits an attorney 
to disclose confidential information by “reporting out,” to regulators 
or courts, but only after meeting Rule 1.13’s “reporting up” 
requirements by bringing his concerns to the client’s top 
management.178  As can be seen from such examples of confidentiality 
regulations, states and bar associations have numerous rules 
governing the attorney’s ethical duty of confidentiality.  However, the 
breadth of such rules is limited by the rules’ exceptions allowing 
lawyers to blow the whistle on their clients using that very same 
confidential information. 
2. Protection of Investors and the Public’s Economic Well-Being 
In order to conduct a fully informed institutional choice analysis of 
attorney-whistleblower regulations, one should also understand 
society’s interest in allowing for greater transparency and disclosure 
of client confidences that may be harmful to society as a whole.  To 
that effect, attorney whistleblowing regulations also implicate a 
significant public interest in preventing financial frauds perpetrated 
against public companies and government institutions.179  Many 
whistleblowing provisions cite this public policy justification in 
encouraging individuals to blow the whistle on clients, employers, 
customers, or others who commit financial wrongdoing.180  However, 
                                                                                                                                         
 175. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.13 (2014). 
 176. Id. 
 177. Stephen Gillers, How to Make Rules for Lawyers: The Professional 
Responsibility of the Legal Profession, 40 PEPP. L. REV. 365, 387 (2013). 
 178. Id.; MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.13 (2014). 
 179. See S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 6 (2005) (noting that whistleblower laws are 
necessary for fraud prevention). 
 180. As one commentator states, “a whistleblower is defined as someone who, 
believing that the public interest overrides the interest of the organization he serves, 
publicly ‘blows the whistle’ if the organization is involved in corrupt, illegal, 
fraudulent, or harmful activity.” Lois A. Lofgren, Whistleblower Protection: Should 
Legislatures and the Courts Provide a Shelter to Public and Private Sector 
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because fraud comes in many forms and has different effects when 
perpetrated in different economic contexts, the strength of, and need 
for, anti-fraud whistleblowing regulations varies from context to 
context.181  Two of the most significant areas of anti-fraud 
whistleblowing legislation in recent years relate to fraud against 
government spending programs,182 and fraud against the investing 
public.183 
The qui tam provision of the FCA is the primary whistleblowing 
provision related to the prevention of fraud against the federal 
government.184  The FCA provides a private right of action for 
individuals, known as relators, to file suit on behalf of the government 
against anyone who brings a false claim for payment to the federal 
government.185  The FCA further provides up to thirty percent of the 
potential judgment to the relator as a reward for whistleblowing 
against the fraudsters and prosecuting their fraud.186  To justify these 
rewards, Congress cited the growth of “sophisticated and widespread 
fraud” against the federal government, stating that “only a 
coordinated effort of both the Government and the citizenry will 
decrease this wave of defrauding public funds.”187  As one 
commentator notes, 
Qui tam’s champions point to its rapid growth and spectacular 
results—some seven thousand cases since 1986 with judgments now 
                                                                                                                                         
Employees Who Disclose the Wrongdoing of Employers?, 38 S.D. L. REV. 316, 316 
(1993) (quoting WHISTLEBLOWING: THE REPORT OF THE CONFERENCE ON 
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (Ralph Nader et al. eds., 1972)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
 181. Senate reports supporting the passage of these provisions provide some 
insight into specific policy justifications. See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 110 (2010) 
(discussing the policy need for a strong securities fraud whistleblower program); S. 
REP. NO. 99-345, at 2 (discussing the need for stronger whistleblower incentives 
under the False Claims Act). 
 182. See S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 6 (discussing the magnitude of recent frauds against 
the federal government, and the importance of the False Claims Act in combating 
this fraud). 
 183. See generally S. REP. NO. 111-176 (discussing recent securities fraud such as 
the Madoff scandal, and the need for strong whistleblower protections to combat 
such frauds). 
 184. James E. Utterback, Substituting an Iron Fist for the Invisible Hand: The 
False Claims Act and Nursing Home Quality of Care—A Legal and Economic 
Perspective, 10 QUINNIPIAC HEALTH L.J. 113, 131 (2007) (characterizing the False 
Claims Act as one of the most important tools for fighting healthcare fraud). 
 185. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(1) (2012); Christina Orsini Broderick, Qui Tam 
Provisions and the Public Interest: An Empirical Analysis, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 949, 
952 (2007). 
 186. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(2). 
 187. S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 2. 
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approaching three billion dollars annually, easily rivaling and even 
eclipsing securities and antitrust litigation—as evidence of massive 
corporate fraud committed against the United States and, in turn, 
the need for a robust private enforcement role.188 
Thus, the success of the FCA’s whistleblower regime in uncovering 
fraud against the government presents at least some argument in 
favor of strong anti-fraud whistleblower incentives and protections in 
this context. 
The primary whistleblower provision regarding fraud against the 
investing public was established by the 2010 Dodd-Frank Act (Dodd-
Frank).189  Dodd-Frank created Section 21F of the Securities and 
Exchange Act of 1934, which created a whistleblower bounty 
program under which individuals are encouraged to bring information 
about securities fraud to the Securities and Exchange Commission.190  
Under section 21F, if this information leads to a successful SEC 
enforcement action in which more than $1 million is recovered, the 
whistleblower is entitled to ten to thirty percent of that recovery as 
reward.191 
Dodd-Frank’s whistleblower program was created in direct 
response to the financial crisis of 2008–2009 that nearly crippled the 
U.S. economy.192  It was intended by Congress to “motivate those with 
inside knowledge to come forward and assist the Government to 
identify and prosecute persons who have violated securities laws,” 
where federal agencies may have failed during the crisis.193  In 
support, Congress noted that “whistleblower tips were 13 times more 
effective than external audits.”194  Thus, whistleblowing by private 
parties was seen as an important tool in society’s fight against growing 
securities and financial fraud.195 
                                                                                                                                         
 188. David Freeman Engstrom, Harnessing the Private Attorney General: 
Evidence from Qui Tam Litigation, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1244, 1246–47 (2012) 
(internal citations omitted). 
 189. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F (2014); Temkin & Moskovits, supra note 75, at 10–11. 
 190. 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F. 
 191. Id. 
 192. S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 110 (2010). 
 193. Id. 
 194. Id. 
 195. It is important to note that SEC Rule 205.3, as discussed above, theoretically 
works in conjunction with Section 21F to allow lawyers to participate in the Dodd-
Frank whistleblower program by loosening confidentiality protections, which might 
have otherwise precluded their participation as whistleblowers in certain 
circumstances. 
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3. The Relationship Between Society’s Interest in Confidentiality 
Protections and Its Interest in Investor Protections 
Some commentators suggest that maintaining robust protections 
over the attorney’s ethical duty of confidentiality, and minimizing 
attorney-whistleblowing opportunity, is the best policy to prevent 
corporate financial fraud.196  These commentators argue that “for a 
lawyer to develop the level of trust necessary to provide effective 
advice, the client must first trust that his “innermost secrets are 
protected by the lawyer’s pledge of silence.”197  The trust that comes 
from strict attorney confidentiality requirements will encourage more 
admissions of fraudulent behavior on the part of large corporate 
clients, where clients would otherwise have hidden wrongdoing even 
from their own outside representatives.198  These open and honest 
attorney-client communications, protected by strict confidentiality 
rules, will then allow lawyers to more effectively advise corporate 
clients against further abuse, shaping corporations into law-abiding 
entities.199  Any anti-fraud legislation creating greater opportunity for 
attorneys to blow the whistle on their clients, therefore, would 
backfire and make fraud even harder to detect and prevent.200  This 
perspective suggests that confidentiality is a valuable tool for public 
investor protection and a necessary part of a government’s anti-fraud 
regulations.201 
However, other scholars and many members of the public do not 
believe that corporate lawyers play the role of the client’s conscience 
in discouraging fraud to the same extent believed by many attorneys 
themselves.202  Many believed that attorneys were actually 
                                                                                                                                         
 196. See, e.g., Evan A. Davis, The Meaning of Professional Independence, 103 
COLUM. L. REV. 1281 (2003) (“Independence from the client, however, is generally 
not a legitimate aspiration for the bar because individuals and organizations need 
lawyers to owe them a duty of loyalty in whom they can confide with confidence.”); 
Lawrence J. Fox, The Fallout from Enron: Media Frenzy and Misguided Notions of 
Public Relations Are No Reason to Abandon Our Commitment to Our Clients, 2003 
U. ILL. L. REV. 1243, 1246 (2003). 
 197. Fox, supra note 196, at 1246. 
 198. See id. 
 199. See, e.g., Barnes, supra note 73 (discussing the perspective that “when clients 
fear their secrets are unsafe, they may not seek or obtain the legal advice that heads 
off behavior that harms the public”). 
 200. Fox, supra note 196, at 1247. 
 201. Spaulding, supra note 153, at 162 (noting that confidentiality protections “may 
give the lawyer unique leverage to counsel compliance” with the law). 
 202. Koniak, supra note 81, at 1237 (noting that lawyers for Enron were 
responsible for “structuring bogus deals, vouching for nonexistent sales, [and] writing 
whitewash reports to keep the sheriff fooled and away”); see also Enron and the 
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participating in some clients’ financial frauds, rather than seeking to 
prevent the frauds, particularly after the Enron scandal in the early 
twenty-first century.203  In light of the possibility of lawyer complicity 
in corporate fraud, some commentators placed value on the power of 
public knowledge to discourage fraud over the power of corporate 
lawyers to prevent it.  This is especially true where lawyers may find 
themselves too close to the perpetrators of the frauds to remain 
objective.204  As one commentator has summarized: 
“The critical issue now being debated is whether, as a matter of 
public policy, the need to protect the investing public by imposing a 
duty on attorneys to reveal evidence of corporate misfeasance and 
fraud should outweigh the traditional protections afforded to the 
attorney-client relationship.”205 
This perspective takes a more skeptical approach to the attorney-
client relationship, suggesting that an attorney’s strict ethical duty of 
confidentiality is fundamentally at odds with the protection of the 
investing public rather than a necessary tool for its protection. 
The relationship between the social goals of confidentiality 
protection and public investor protection is convoluted at best.  
Untangling the two requires a deep understanding of the lawyer-
client relationship, the functioning and daily operation of corporate 
entities, the impact of ongoing financial fraud on the economy, and 
the effect of whistleblowing on such fraud as a whole.  The difficulty 
experienced by individuals in striking the proper balance between the 
two interests (i.e., in making the proper “goal choice” decision) 
underscores the important role of institutions in the rule making 
process.  Individuals are only capable of mastering so much 
information in complex social processes and relationships, such as 
                                                                                                                                         
Lawyers, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 2002, at A14.  For a response from the legal profession, 
see Fox, supra note 196, at 1243. 
 203. Enron and the Lawyers, supra note 202. 
 204. For a discussion of the close lawyer-client friendship that often develops 
during the course of representation, see GEOFFREY C. HAZARD ET AL., THE LAW OF 
ETHICS AND LAWYERING 20–21(3d ed. 1999). 
 205. Beck, supra note 116, at 898.  The ABA Task Force on Corporate 
Responsibility appeared to accept this formulation of the issue in its 2003 report.  
That report stated in part:  
The Task Force believed that where the client abuses the client-lawyer 
relationship by using the lawyer’s services to commit a crime or fraud that 
results in substantial economic harm to another, the policy of protecting 
confidentiality is outweighed by the policy of protecting the interests of 
society and the professional integrity of the lawyer. 
AM. BAR ASS’N, A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY: THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ABA RULES 
OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, 1982–2013, at 139 (Art Garwin ed., 2013). 
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those at issue discussed in this Part.  As such, larger and more 
complex decision-making entities (i.e., public institutions) are needed 
to deal with such issues.206  According to ICT, the role of the 
individual in this decision-making process is not the untangling and 
mastering of these inter-related social interests, but the selection of 
the institution that is most qualified for that role.207  Thus, the purpose 
of this Note’s discussion of the two social interests underlying 
whistleblowing regulation is to help inform individuals’ decision 
regarding which institution is “best” to regulate those social interests. 
C. The Potential Regulating Institutions for Attorney 
Whistleblowing Regulations 
1. The State Judiciary 
Because state judicial branches dominate the current system of 
attorney behavior regulation, no institutional analysis would be 
complete without a comparison of the state judiciary to other 
potential regulatory institutions.208  While the structures of state 
judiciaries’ attorney regulation systems vary from state to state, many 
of their most salient institutional characteristics are shared in 
common.  Most basic of these characteristics is the fact that most 
states’ high court holds the primary responsibility for the enactment 
of rules of professional responsibility.209  Therefore, this Note treats 
the “state judiciary” label as synonymous with the typical state high 
court.  Notably, all high court judges are lawyers, and most supreme 
court justices must face election to gain or keep their jobs.210 
2. State Legislature 
State legislatures are becoming increasingly involved in many areas 
of lawyer regulation.211  While state legislatures have not yet sought to 
enact rules explicitly regulating attorney whistleblowing, legislatures’ 
practical and historical connection to the issues underlying attorney 
                                                                                                                                         
 206. See supra notes 137–141 and accompanying text. 
 207. See supra notes 30–34 and accompanying text. 
 208. See Barton, supra note 34, at 1185 (starting an institutional analysis with the 
state courts as the primary regulatory institution in this area). 
 209. Zacharias & Green, supra note 2, at 94 (noting that conduct rules must first be 
adopted by state courts before becoming effective). 
 210. Barton, supra note 34, at 1185–86. 
 211. See id. at 1171 n.15. 
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regulation make them a logical choice for comparison.212  For 
example, scholars have noted that the current system of attorney 
regulation was not always dominated by state judiciaries as it is now; 
state legislatures originally played a much larger role.213  Scholars 
have argued that the shift to the current, judiciary-centric model of 
attorney regulation occurred as a result of “history and tradition” 
rather than purely reasoned public policy.214  Because the decision to 
entrust attorney behavior regulation to state judiciaries was not made 
as a conscious policy decision, ex post facto institutional choice 
analysis is a necessary part of any argument either for, or against, the 
judiciary-controlled status quo.215 
III.  A COMPARATIVE INSTITUTIONAL MICROANALYSIS OF 
STATE COURTS AND LEGISLATURES REGARDING THEIR 
RELATIVE COMPETENCE TO DRAFT ATTORNEY-
WHISTLEBLOWING REGULATIONS 
Part III of this Note presents a side-by-side comparison of three 
types of institutional characteristics that affect state high courts and 
legislatures’ ability to create attorney-whistleblowing regulations.  
The purpose of this analysis is to determine which institution is the 
“best” for this specific regulatory role.  First, this Part will compare 
the two institutions’ expertise.  Next, this Part will discuss their 
impartiality and independence, and finally it will discuss their 
institutional “accountability” and the public access they provide to 
their decision-making process. 
The determination of which institution is the “best” for a given 
regulatory role is heavily influenced by the choice of characteristics 
along which the institutions are compared.216  An institutional 
comparison that values constitutional authority may arrive at a 
different result than a comparison which values accountability or 
transparency.217  For the results to be significant, therefore, the 
compared institutional characteristics should be ones relevant to the 
                                                                                                                                         
 212. See, e.g., Charles W. Wolfram Toward A History of the Legalization of 
American Legal Ethics—II the Modern Era, 15 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 205, 211 
(2002) (noting that “the prevalence of legislative regulation of lawyers remained the 
accepted arrangement throughout much of the nineteenth century”). 
 213. See, e.g., id. at 211–12. 
 214. See Kaufman, supra note 5; Wald, Should Judges Regulate Lawyers?, supra 
note 5, at 175 (noting that there was not much public interest in the rules of 
professional conduct during the early years of its development). 
 215. See Wald, Should Judges Regulate Lawyers?, supra note 5, at 175. 
 216. See Barton, supra note 34, at 1177. 
 217. See id. 
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specific regulatory task in question.  In the case of attorney-
whistleblowing regulation, the regulatory task involves the balancing 
of potentially conflicting needs for lawyer-client trust and investor 
protection.  This Note’s analysis will compare state legislatures to 
state judiciaries along three groups of characteristics which impact 
institutions ability to balance these interests: (1) substantive and 
procedural expertise, (2) impartiality, and (3) accountability and 
public access.218 
Regarding substantive expertise, this Note compares the two 
institutions’ knowledge and experience in the relevant fields of 
lawyer-client confidentiality and investor protection.219  This expertise 
(or lack thereof) has a significant impact on the institutions’ ability to 
regulate attorney whistle-blowing for two reasons.  One reason is 
effectiveness: if an institution is unfamiliar with the subject matter, it 
will not be able to monitor that area effectively or achieve desired 
regulatory results.220  Another reason is efficiency: “[t]he more 
familiar policymakers are with the regulated industry, the less time 
they spend investigating and fact-finding, thus increasing 
efficiency.”221 
The procedural expertise category will compare the institutions’ 
relative abilities to promulgate rules in general.  It is important to 
note that the procedural expertise category compares the legislative 
ability of legislators to the legislative ability of judges.  A focus on the 
legislative ability of courts is relatively unusual in institutional choice 
analysis, which typically focuses on courts’ judicial capabilities.222  The 
distinction between a court’s legislative and adjudicative functions is 
significant because many of the characteristics typically ascribed to 
courts—such as impartiality, independence, and reliance on 
                                                                                                                                         
 218. While these are specific group categories compared in institutional analyses of 
attorney behavior regulation, the broad outlines of chosen characteristics have more 
in common than not. See id. at 1177–78 (focusing on the institutional characteristics 
of rent-seeking (or self-interest), procedural efficiency, and democratization); Mehta, 
supra note 3, at 66 (focusing on authority, competence, expertise, and impartiality); 
see also ADRIAN VERMEULE, MECHANISMS OF DEMOCRACY 4 (2007) (listing 
impartiality, accountability, transparency, and deliberation as four of the core values 
which democratic institutions should serve). 
 219. In describing particular institutional qualities, this Note relies heavily on 
previous institutional choice studies and the observations of leading scholars in the 
field. 
 220. Mehta, supra note 3, at 83–84 (noting that the “‘best’ set of professional 
responsibility rules will be promulgated when the drafters of the rule have some 
expertise in drafting these rules and knowing which rules will most likely produce the 
‘best’ outcome”). 
 221. Barton, supra note 34, at 1184. 
 222. See id. at 1174. 
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precedent—relate to courts’ adjudicative role and legislative role in 
very different (and sometimes contradictory) ways.223  Under the 
“impartiality” characteristic, this Note compares the potentially 
detrimental effects of regulatory capture and institutional 
interdependence on the two institutions.  And finally, “accountability 
and access to the public” compares the two institutions’ relative 
accountability to the public, the transparency of their decision-making 
processes, and the access they provide into their decision-making 
process. 
For its discussion of the specific qualities possessed by state 
judiciaries and legislatures, this Note draws on the observations of 
previous institutional choice analyses which compare their capacity to 
regulate attorney behavior in general.224  In particular, this Note 
builds on the observations of Professor Benjamin Barton’s 2003 
study, which concluded that institutional comparison of courts, 
legislatures, and the market favored legislative control of the legal 
industry as a whole.225  Taking into account the current challenges in 
applying unifying observations across a diversifying legal industry, 
this Note analyzes and further develops these observations as they 
relate specifically to the regulation of attorney-whistleblowing, rather 
than attorney behavior in general. 
A. Institutional Expertise 
It is generally accepted that “the ‘best’ set of professional 
responsibility rules will be promulgated when the drafters of the rule 
have some expertise in drafting these rules and knowing which rules 
will most likely produce the best outcome.”226  Thus, while lack of 
institutional expertise can be offset by strength in other areas, 
expertise in the subject being regulated remains a substantial factor in 
an institution’s capacity for successful regulation.  The related 
“procedural expertise” category analyzes the institution’s relative 
technical competence in the rulemaking process itself.  It is important 
to keep in mind that this category compares the legislative capacity of 
legislatures to the legislative capacity of courts. 
                                                                                                                                         
 223. See id. 
 224. See generally id. 
 225. Id.  at 1241–42. 
 226. Mehta, supra note 3, at 83–84 (noting that “academics and thought-leaders 
consider ‘institutional expertise’ an important factor, if not, the most important 
factor, in considering the appropriate actor to spearhead a government action”). 
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1. State Judiciary 
a. Substantive Expertise 
State supreme court judges have been described as “generalists” 
whose expertise is in the “methodology of the common law.”227  This 
general expertise deals with the technical development of the 
structure of law rather than any particular substantive field.228  That 
being said, judges on state supreme courts are all former lawyers, and 
often have gained substantial experience in the practice of law prior 
to joining the bench.229  In part because of this fact, “[t]here has been 
a long-standing assumption that the courts have particular expertise 
in knowing what the proper scope of attorney conduct rules should 
entail.”230  Some scholars suggest that this expertise includes a general 
understanding of the legal market, and the effects that a courts’ 
regulations would have on that market.231 
The assumption of judicial expertise over attorney behavior is 
particularly strong regarding litigation and trial conduct.232  This is 
logical, as the focus of a judge’s career is overseeing of the litigation 
process itself.233  Since the early twentieth century, however, the 
central role of litigation-based practice has been steadily shrinking in 
relation to other practice areas.234  The industry has diversified to 
where a significant percentage of lawyers rarely see the inside of a 
courtroom.235  Thus, there are growing areas of the law in which many 
experienced state high court justices have little practical exposure.236 
                                                                                                                                         
 227. Ellen A. Peters, State Constitutional Law: Federalism in the Common Law 
Tradition, 84 MICH. L. REV. 583, 592 (1986). 
 228. See id. 
 229. Barton, supra note 34, at 1196–97. 
 230. Mehta, supra note 3, at 87.  While Mehta’s study focuses on federal rather 
than state judicial expertise, justices of state high courts are viewed in this context 
with similarly high regard. See Barton, supra note 34, at 1210.  State trial courts, not 
dealt with in this Note, may be another story entirely. 
 231. See Barton, supra note 34, at 1210. 
 232. See id. at 1210 n.161 (“Most justices come to the bench from a litigation 
background.  Their knowledge of the practices of other areas of specialty, such as tax 
or transactional law, might be limited.”). 
 233. See id. 
 234. Charles Wolfram, supra note 103, at 5. 
 235. Id. (“The average lawyer no longer spends very much time in court.  In fact, 
the great majority of lawyers would starve if they had to make their living out of 
court appearances.”). 
 236. See, e.g., Barton, supra note 34, at 1247–50; Stanley Sporkin, The Need for 
Separate Codes of Professional Conduct for the Various Specialties, 7 GEO. J. LEGAL 
ETHICS 149, 149 (1993) (asserting that additional ethical codes are necessary for 
nonlitigators). 
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Further minimizing judicial expertise in this context is the lawyer-
centric worldview that often results from judges’ natural connection 
to the legal community.237  This limited judicial worldview makes it 
more likely that judges’ generalized institutional expertise covers 
confidentiality aspects of attorney-whistleblower regulations in the 
broadest sense, but may not cover the economic concerns implicated 
by such rules.238  While some judges may have such broad-based 
expertise based on personal experience, this is likely not the case in 
general; the election process by which most judges on state supreme 
courts obtain and keep their jobs does not select based on expertise in 
these areas.239  Rather, politics and other non-merit-based 
considerations often come into play.240  Because of this, state 
judiciaries as a whole are not likely to possess substantive expertise 
regarding both attorney confidentiality and public investor 
protection—the two topics most relevant to attorney-whistleblowing 
regulations. 241 
b. Procedural Expertise 
Maintenance of a state high court’s rulemaking expertise is 
motivated in part by a desire to meet the needs of the courts on which 
those judges serve: when the lawyers practicing before them meet 
                                                                                                                                         
 237. Jonathan R. Macey, Judicial Preferences, Public Choice, and the Rules of 
Procedure, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 627, 631 (1994) (noting that judges’ prior experience in 
the legal system “is likely to align their preferences with the preferences [and 
interests] of the legal community as a whole.  Consequently, judges are likely to view 
procedural rules that maximize the demand for lawyers’ services as socially 
desirable . . . ”). 
 238. Wald, Should Judges Regulate Lawyers?, supra note 5, at 158 (arguing that 
the further removed a specialty is from court, the less expertise judges will have in 
that field).  While the argument for lack of judicial expertise in particular areas of law 
is a broad generalization across state court systems, there may be exceptions to the 
rule. See, e.g., United States v. Quest Diagnostics, Inc., 734 F.3d 154, 163 (2d Cir. 
2013) (noting that New York’s rule of professional conduct governing attorney 
whistleblowing, N.Y. Rule 1.6(b), is consistent with both economic and legal-industry 
interests); R. William Ide, Post-Enron Corporate Governance Opportunities: 
Creating a Culture of Greater Board Collaboration and Oversight, 54 MERCER L. 
REV. 829, 854 (2003) (noting the expertise of Delaware courts in corporate law 
matters). 
 239. See Barton, supra note 34, at 1185–86. 
 240. See id. (arguing that because most state judges face election, state courts 
“typically are much less independent from voter sentiment than federal courts”). 
 241. See Macey, supra note 237, at 643 (noting that judges have substantive 
expertise in procedural norms, but little substantive expertise in finance and 
economics). 
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higher standards of conduct, the judges’ own jobs become easier.242  
However, state high court judges’ primary role is adjudicating, not 
legislating.  Because of this, judges spend far less of their time and 
energy on developing the rules of professional conduct than they do 
on adjudicating the common law cases before them.243 
The judicial system’s natural focus on adjudication has a negative 
effect on its procedural rulemaking expertise for several reasons.  
First, fewer resources devoted to rulemaking means less opportunity 
to develop institutional capacity to make rules, and creates a greater 
motivation to delegate the task of rule-drafting to others.244  Because 
this lack of procedural capacity has led courts to delegate their 
rulemaking role to the bar to such an extent that state high courts 
now play only a nominal role in the rule drafting process, much of the 
substantive expertise that the judges may have otherwise brought to 
bear on the subject of ethical duties of confidentiality has been 
nullified.245 
Further, to the extent that high courts do develop their own drafts 
of conduct regulations, an analysis of their regulatory procedure is 
hampered by the opacity of the judicial regulatory process.  In 
general, judges’ internal deliberation processes are not well 
publicized, and are not well understood by the public.246  This not only 
inhibits a full analysis of state courts’ procedural expertise, but also 
detracts from the democratic nature of its rulemaking process.247 
                                                                                                                                         
 242. See Barton, supra note 34, at 1210 (“[T]he regulation of lawyers is at least 
partially motivated by a desire to meet the needs of the courts, and supreme courts 
are in an excellent position to determine those needs.”). 
 243. See id. at 1207 (arguing that judges would be expected to delegate away as 
much of their rulemaking role as possible in order to “preserve leisure and to 
maximize the time and energy they have to spend on their primary job, deciding 
cases”). 
 244. See id. 
 245. Id.; see also Zacharias & Green, supra note 2, at 94 (noting that state high 
courts’ failure to take a more active role in attorney conduct regulation has led 
practitioners to treat the rules as “non-authoritative”). 
 246. Zacharias & Green, supra note 2, at 104 (noting the public’s difficulty in 
determining how judges make their decisions). 
 247. For a discussion of the accountability of state courts’ rulemaking procedure, 
see supra Part II.C. 
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2. State Legislatures 
a. State Legislatures’ Substantive Expertise 
State legislatures have a substantial disadvantage in institutional 
expertise.248  For one thing, a substantial proportion of state 
legislators are non-lawyers.249  Term limits and resource constraints 
also generally preclude any individual state legislature from 
developing expertise in specialized areas like attorney regulation over 
long periods of time.250  On the other hand, as Professor Barton notes, 
“regulating lawyers is not rocket science.  State legislatures certainly 
can handle debates over the unauthorized practice of law or the scope 
of lawyer confidentiality without complicated or technical 
explanations.”251  Thus, while the average state legislator likely does 
not have substantial expertise in lawyer confidentiality, legislators 
should be able to handle debates covering the topic without 
significant trouble. 
b. State Legislatures’ Procedural Expertise 
Regarding the importance of procedural expertise, “it seems 
natural to prefer the institution that has been designed for, and is 
practiced in, regulating rather than adjudicating.”252  Thus, where the 
state supreme courts’ lack of procedural expertise inhibits their 
capacity to apply their substantive expertise in attorney conduct 
regulation,253  this situation is reversed regarding state legislatures.  
Legislatures’ strong procedural tool-kit and expertise in rulemaking 
more than make up for their lack of substantive expertise in any 
particular area of law.   As one scholar notes, “[t]he legislative 
process provides many opportunities for gathering relevant 
information and deliberating about it.”254  For example, legislatures 
can hold formal committee meetings and floor debates, as well as 
informal discussions with constituents, lobbyists, officers of the 
                                                                                                                                         
 248. Barton, supra note 34 at 1227. 
 249. Id. at 1224. 
 250. Kenneth B. Davis, Jr., Epilogue: The Role of the Hostile Takeover and the 
Role of the States, 1988 WIS. L. REV. 491, 509 n.70 (1988). 
 251. Barton, supra note 34, at 1228. 
 252. Id. at 1224. 
 253. See supra Part II.A.1.b. 
 254. Philip P. Frickey, The Communion of Strangers: Representative Government, 
Direct Democracy, and the Privatization of the Public Sphere, 34 WILLAMETTE L. 
REV. 421, 435 (1998). 
2015] ATTORNEY-WHISTLEBLOWING 1009 
executive branch, and subdivisions of state governments.255  They can 
also conduct studies, and hear testimony from experts in a given 
field.256  Use of these tools over a period of weeks or months helps to 
ensure better drafting of legislation and “builds institutional 
knowledge throughout the legislature and the expertise of at least a 
few legislators and staff members.”257  As a result, “the legislative 
process reduces the dangers of manipulation, misunderstanding, or 
misguided and unworkable policies. If a consensus cannot emerge, at 
least a compromise might. And if nothing productive results in the 
short run, the legislative door remains open in the future.”258 
Consequently, where legislatures may lack substantive knowledge 
of their own regarding a particular subject, the deliberate 
consideration of information “carefully gathered” from outside 
sources may provide legislators with the background necessary to pass 
an informed bill on the subject.259  Thus, where a lack of substantive 
knowledge leads state high courts to delegate the regulation-drafting 
task into the hands of lawyers themselves, legislatures are able to 
obtain the necessary substantive knowledge without delegating the 
rulemaking task to the legal industry. 
B. Impartiality 
The next characteristic to be compared, impartiality, analyzes the 
impact of regulatory capture on each institution. “Agency capture” 
refers to the tendency of a regulating institution to submit to the 
lobbying influence of the regulated industry.260  The more influence an 
industry has over the creation of the rules governing its own 
operation, the more those rules will be biased in favor of that 
industry—even at the expense of the rest of society.261  In the context 
of attorney-whistleblower regulations, regulatory capture takes the 
                                                                                                                                         
 255. See id. (discussing several procedural tools available to state legislatures). 
 256. See id. 
 257. Id. at 436.  Considerable attention is often given to information collected using 
these tools. Id. But c.f., Ted Schneyer, Who Should Define Arizona’s Corporate 
Attorney-Client Privilege?: Asserting Judicial Independence Through the Power to 
Regulate the Practice of Law, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 419, 452–53 (2006) (discussing a law 
passed by Arizona’s state legislature where the legislature heard little testimony from 
opponents, considered no empirical data, and did not adequately understand the 
topic before the law’s enactment). 
 258. Frickey, supra note 254, at 436. 
 259. See id. 
 260. See Barton, supra note 34, at 1179. 
 261. See id. at 1178 (“[G]overnment regulation and regulators frequently serve the 
interests of a regulated industry ahead of the public at large . . . .”). 
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form of the regulating institution delegating the primary role in 
drafting conduct rules into the hands of the regulated industry itself.262 
1. State High Courts 
As a starting point for analysis of the regulatory capture of state 
supreme courts, two observations must be noted: first, all state high 
court judges are lawyers; and second, most high court judges must 
face election to gain or keep their jobs.263  As lawyers themselves, 
judges may be partial to the legal industry at the expense of other 
sectors of society.264  And because elections for judicial office are 
typically of low salience and visibility in the public eye, judges often 
rely on the organized bar to promote their election campaigns and 
lobby on their behalf.265 
Further, many of the institutional characteristics that help maintain 
the state judiciary’s neutral, independent status as a dispute 
adjudicator do not protect the institution from lobbying and self-
interest in its legislative rule-making role.266  In its adjudicative role, 
for example, a court’s power is limited to ruling on the facts of the 
case before it.  Judges are bound by past precedent, seek to conform 
to norms of judicial behavior, and are generally required to make 
their logic and reasoning public through written opinions.267  These 
qualities do not play a role in the legislation of attorney conduct rules, 
making state high courts far more open to self-interested lobbying in 
their legislative rulemaking capacity than in their adjudicative 
capacity. 
This lack of institutional independence, combined with the courts’ 
tendencies to delegate rulemaking to bar associations, means that 
court-approved ethics rules will inevitably be developed with 
significant legal industry and bar association input.268  The courts’ role 
in the process is merely to “supervise the limits of bar association 
                                                                                                                                         
 262. See id. at 1208, 1218 (noting the circumstances under which the legal industry 
has exercised control over both courts’ and legislatures’ attempts to regulate that 
industry). 
 263. See id. at 1185–86. 
 264. See id. at 1189 (noting some of the shared interests uniting judges and 
practicing lawyers).  Judges’ status as lawyers plays a role in analyzing their potential 
expertise as well as potential for regulatory capture by the legal industry. See supra 
Part II.A. 
 265. See id. at 1201–02. 
 266. See id. at 1198–1200. 
 267. See, e.g., Ronald A. Cass, Judging: Norms and Incentives of Retrospective 
Decision-Making, 75 B.U. L. REV. 941, 968–69 (1995). 
 268. Zacharias & Green, supra note 2, at 110. 
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power-to accept the valid aspects of the proposals, but to avoid 
‘capture’ by the bar.”269  However, the ability of a state court to avoid 
capture in this process decreases dramatically when the courts’ 
position on a proposed rule or policy is antithetical to the organized 
bar’s core principles—its “normative vision” of how the law should be 
practiced.270 
Regulation of attorneys’ ethical duty of confidentiality is one 
rulemaking area where a state judiciary’s interests may come in 
conflict with the core “normative vision” of the bar, further limiting 
its institutional independence.271  This is in part because the concept 
of confidentiality is so central to the identity of the bar that it views 
an attack on confidentiality protections as an attack on the profession 
as a whole.272  In fact, “it is confidentiality, and particularly the duty to 
keep client confidences from the state, more often than any other 
norm, that triggers the obligation to resist competing state norms and 
that justifies the passage of ethics rules to ‘undo’ state 
pronouncements.”273  Because of the heightened attention and 
support that the bar provides to confidentiality protections, “the 
eventual confidentiality rules enacted by state judiciaries would 
reflect the will and influence of the regulated industry to a much 
greater extent than in other areas of regulation.”274  Thus, a state 
judiciary’s ability to maintain independence from the target of its 
confidentiality regulations—the legal industry—is practically 
nonexistent in this context. 
2. State Legislatures 
Similarly, state legislatures have been called the “poster children” 
for regulatory capture by lobbying groups.275  Legislatures rely on 
special interest groups for campaign finance, public support, and 
input on particular areas of legislation.276  However, because relatively 
few state legislatures are practicing lawyers, and legislatures do not 
                                                                                                                                         
 269. Id. 
 270. See Susan Koniak, The Law Between the Bar and the State, 70 N.C. L. REV. 
1389, 1391–92 (1992); see also Dzienkowski, supra note 111, at 86 (listing “core 
principles” prioritized by the bar, including “the lawyer’s duty to disclose another 
lawyer’s misconduct,” as well as loyalty, confidentiality, and “communication in light 
of a lawyer’s fiduciary duties to the client”). 
 271. Koniak, supra note 270, at 1391. 
 272. Id. at 1427. 
 273. Id. 
 274. Id. 
 275. See Barton, supra note 34, at 1217. 
 276. See id. 
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rely on lawyers for their day-to-day functioning, legislators do not 
share the same tendency for regulatory capture by the legal industry, 
as seen in state court systems.277  Rather, state legislatures are “open 
to lobbying and contributions from all comers and have no natural 
reason to expect or rely particularly on the bar for political 
support.”278  Thus, where lawyers may wield undue influence over the 
rulemaking process managed by state high courts, lawyers find 
themselves placed on more equal footing with the rest of the public 
when dealing with state legislatures.279 
C. Accountability and Accessibility 
The “accountability and accessibility” category compares several 
aspects of the institutions’ democratic nature, such as their 
responsiveness to the needs of the public, and the transparency of 
their decision-making process.280  These concerns are important for 
effective and efficient regulation of attorney behavior in general for 
several reasons.281  On an ideological level, open and accessible 
institutions further the constitutional aims of maintaining a 
functioning “deliberative democracy.”282  On a practical level, a more 
open and democratic regulatory process helps to prevent regulatory 
capture by particular interest groups and increases economic 
efficiency.283 
1. State High Courts  
In general, state courts are not lobbied by the public.284  Rather, 
they are organized specifically to minimize the effect of public 
opinion and lobbying on judges.285  For example, “[t]he public cannot 
just stop by a justice’s chambers to complain about lawyer regulation, 
nor are justices provided with staff to respond to constituent 
                                                                                                                                         
 277. See id. at 1220. 
 278. Id. at 1219. 
 279. See id. at 1220–21. 
 280. See id. at 1177–78. 
 281. See id. 
 282. Id. at 1177 n.36; see also Joan MacLeod Heminway, Rock, Paper, Scissors: 
Choosing the Right Vehicle for Federal Corporate Governance Initiatives, 10 
FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 225, 264 (2005) (arguing that deliberativeness, 
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 283. Barton, supra note 34, at 1178–80 (discussing the impact of an institution’s 
accessibility on its potential for regulatory capture). 
 284. See id. at 1201–02. 
 285. See id. at 1201. 
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complaints or lobbying.”286  Because of this, the general population 
can exert very little influence on the decision-making process of state 
court judges. 
While such independence and immunity from public opinion is 
lauded in the context of resolving legal disputes, these qualities 
become “problematic” when dealing with lawyer regulation.287  Not 
only does judicial inaccessibility detract from the democratic 
legitimacy of the process, but it also skews the balance of influence 
over the rule-making process dramatically in favor of lawyers 
themselves.288  This is true in part because lawyers have natural access 
to judges through their day-to-day work as well as through bar 
associations on which both lawyers and justices serve.289  This fact 
makes state court judges “an easy target for formal and informal 
lawyer lobbying.”290  Combined with the fact that judges pride 
themselves on their isolation from the influences of other parties and 
public opinion, it would appear that lawyers have much greater access 
and influence over the process than any other group.291 
2. State Legislatures 
Compared to state courts, “legislatures are open by design.”292  
Individual legislators generally make an affirmative effort to make 
themselves available to their constituents for contact and comment on 
legislative functions.293  This quality is rooted deep in the “ethos” of 
American democracy, which generally includes “following the will of 
the electorate” and necessarily requires a broad range of input from 
the voting public.294  According to this democratic ethos, “all are 
deemed to have a right to know about and influence decision making” 
in the American legislative process.295  Rulemaking by judges—
                                                                                                                                         
 286. Id. 
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 288. Zacharias & Green, supra note 2, at 96 (noting that “[o]ne should not casually 
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trained to isolate themselves from the public—thus provides far less 
opportunity for public input or dissent. 
D. Conclusion of the Comparative Institutional Choice 
Microanalysis 
As is suggested by this Note’s hypothetical application of 
comparative institutional microanalysis, the status quo of judiciary 
and lawyer dominated legal industry regulation is not the “best” 
method for the creation of conduct rules relating specifically to 
attorney-whistleblowing.  State courts, far more than legislatures, 
tend to defer to the whims of the legal industry in creating favorable 
rules for its regulation; this effect is compounded when dealing with 
regulation of core values of the legal industry, such as confidentiality.  
With state courts in control of attorney confidentiality and 
whistleblowing regulation, the regulatory process substantially favors 
the legal industry over the public and the wider economy.  If 
legislatures were given greater control of attorney-whistleblowing 
regulation, on the other hand, rule-makers would have use of the 
organized bar’s expertise in the form of expert testimony and reports, 
but would also have greater capacity to weigh evidence from other 
facets of society for or against particular regulatory language favored 
by the bar. 
In addition, because state high courts are organized to minimize 
the effects of public opinion on the decision-making process, the 
public has little influence over the courts’ legislative role in the 
attorney-whistleblowing-regulation process.  This lack of public 
influence leads to a relatively undemocratic rulemaking process that 
prioritizes the interests of practicing lawyers rather than the needs of 
the economy or the public at large.  Lodging rulemaking authority 
with a more publicly accountable institution like state legislatures 
would ensure that ethics rules are based on public need rather than 
lawyer self-interest.296 
E. Further Narrowing the Context of Institutional Microanalysis 
Raises Questions for Future Study 
Even applied to the factual context of attorney-whistleblowing 
regulations, however, the results of a comparative institutional 
                                                                                                                                         
 
 296. See Deborah L. Rhode & Lucy Buford Ricca, Protecting the Profession or the 
Public? Rethinking Unauthorized-Practice Enforcement, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 2587, 
2599 (2014). 
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analysis are far from definitive.  The results of individual institutional 
choice microanalyses may vary depending on the choice of 
institutions discussed, the relevant characteristics compared, and the 
broadness or specificity of the context in which the institutions are 
being compared.  Here, the chosen context is a “mid-level” of 
specificity, analyzing a sub-category of attorney conduct regulation—
attorney whistleblowing regulations regarding client fraud.297  On the 
other hand, the chosen categories of institutions to be compared 
(state courts and state legislatures) actually aggregate fifty 
independent court systems and fifty independent legislative systems 
into two overarching categories.298  While many of their practical 
differences are immaterial to this Note’s comparison, several states do 
possess courts and legislatures whose relevant characteristics vary 
significantly from those of other states. 
In particular, state courts in New York and Delaware differ 
dramatically from their counterparts in other states regarding their 
expertise in economic issues.299  On one hand, it is widely accepted 
that judges lack significant expertise when it comes to the regulation 
of complex non-legal activities like investor protection or financial 
fraud prevention.300  However, Delaware goes against this trend, and 
Delaware courts have in fact been noted for their expertise in 
business and corporate matters.301  Additionally, New York’s courts’ 
balancing of corporate and legal-industry interests has, unlike the 
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balancing of other state courts, received the stamp of approval of the 
federal judiciary.302 
Several characteristics unique to Delaware make its distinctive 
economic and corporate-law expertise possible.  For example, a 
substantial proportion of the country’s corporations are chartered in 
Delaware.303  Because of this, many Delaware judges see a high 
concentration of corporate cases relative to other types of cases.304  
The high concentration enhances the economic expertise of Delaware 
courts in two ways: first, judges themselves obtain expertise from the 
substantial proportion of corporate-law case before them.305  Second, 
judges are able to obtain significant corporate-law expertise by 
working as attorneys in the Delaware legal system prior to reaching 
the bench in the first place.306  The fact that Delaware’s high court 
selects its members based on merit rather than popular election only 
adds to the concentration of expert judges on the Delaware bench.307 
While the economic expertise of judges in New York is not as 
prominent as the expertise of judges in Delaware, New York state 
courts have nevertheless been recognized for competence in the area 
of commercial law.308  New York courts’ expertise likely derives in 
large part from the state’s large overall population and major 
commercial hub—New York City.  As one scholar notes, states with 
large populations see a broader range of cases, and are more likely to 
develop specialized case law in particular substantive areas over 
time.309  While simply being a large state may not be enough to 
guarantee specialization in a particular substantive area of law, the 
presence of a major commercial hub like New York City also creates 
a concentration of commercial cases in New York courts in and 
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around the city.310  Further institutional analysis comparing those 
states institutions will be necessary, however, in order to better 
understand the effects that these unique qualities have on the two 
states’ attorney-regulating institutions. 
CONCLUSION 
Throughout the history of the drafting of confidentiality and 
attorney-whistleblower regulations, public policy considerations have 
taken a back seat to the influences of political compromise, self-
interest, and reactions to public opinion or sudden economic events.  
While the resulting regulations, such as New York Rule of Conduct 
1.6 and SEC Rule 205.3, are not necessarily rendered inefficient or 
ineffective as a result, little effort has been expended by the relevant 
decision-makers to determine whether or not these rules are, in fact, 
as effective as they could be from a public policy perspective. 
To this end, institutional choice analysis has been used to develop 
at least some public policy support for the rules throughout the course 
of their development.  However, this analysis has been conducted 
only in a cursory and “intuitive” fashion, and could greatly benefit 
from a more rigorous comparative institutional microanalysis of the 
public policy benefits of particular rules.  Through further analysis 
focusing on the public policy concerns surrounding regulations, like 
those governing attorney confidentiality and whistleblowing, rule 
makers will be able to draft regulations that are more consistent in 
their application and more effective in achieving their public policy 
goals. 
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